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Computer and network security systems rely on the privacy and authenticity of 
information, which requires implementation of cryptographic functions. Basic functions 
of information security include secret-key and public-key cryptosystems, message-digest 
algorithms, and digital signature functions. Software implementations of these algorithms 
are often desired because of their flexibility and cost effectiveness. However, performance 
has always been an issue, requiring the algorithm engineer to invent and develop  new 
methods for high-speed implementations. The computational cost of software cryptogra­
phy is a function of the underlying algorithm and the quality of the implementation of the 
algorithm [1].  In this study, we concentrate on developing high-speed and area-efficient 
algorithms for number-theoretic cryptosystems.  In this framework, we study modular 
multiplication and exponentiation in finite fields. 
We first investigate fast algorithms for modular multiplication which is a popular 
operation used in number-theoretic cryptosystems. The RSA algorithm [2], the Diffie-
Hellman key exchange scheme [3] and Digital signature standard [4] require the computa­
tion of modular exponentiation, which is broken into a series of modular multiplications 
by the application of the binary or m -ary methods [5]. These algorithms can be imple­
mented in hardware and software [6, 7]. One of the most interesting advances in modular 
exponentiation has been the introduction of Montgomery multiplication [8]. It became de 
facto algorithm in any cryptographic method utilizing modular multiplication, especially 
the RSA cryptosystem [9, 10]. We are interested in two aspects of modular multiplication 
algorithms: development of fast and convenient methods on a given hardware platform, 2 
and hardware requirements to achieve high-performance algorithms. 
Arithmetic operations in the Galois field GF(2k) have several applications in coding 
theory, computer algebra, and cryptography. We are especially interested in cryptographic 
applications where k is very large. Examples of the cryptographic applications are the 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm [3] based on the discrete exponentiation and elliptic 
curve cryptosystems [11, 12, 13] over the field GF(2k). The Diffie-Hellman algorithm 
requires implementation of the exponentiation ge, where g is a fixed primitive element 
of the field and e an integer. In elliptic curves, the exponentiation is used to compute 
inverse of an element a E GF(2k), based on Fermat's identity a-1 = a2k-2 [14, 15, 16]. The 
exponentiation operation can be implemented using a series of squaring and multiplication 
operations in GF(2k) using the binary method [5]. 
In Chapter 2., several Montgomery multiplication algorithms are discussed [8]. We 
focus on developing time and space efficient algorithms for the Montgomery multiplication. 
We first study two previously introduced algorithms [17, 18]. We then introduce three 
new time and space efficient algorithms, and analyze their space and time requirements in 
detail. These algorithms are implemented in C and in Intel 486 assembler for comparing 
their time requirements. 
In Chapter 3., we show that the operation c = a  b  r-1 in the field GF(2k) can 
be implemented significantly faster in software than the standard multiplication, where 
r is a special element of the field [19].  This operation is a finite field analogue of the 
Montgomery multiplication for modular multiplication of integers [8]. The Montgomery 
multiplication can be used to achieve fast discrete exponentiation operation  in GF(2k), 
and is particularly suitable for cryptographic applications where k is large. 
In Chapter 4., we examine the implementation issues of number-theoretic  crypto­
graphic algorithms (e.g., RSA and Diffie-Hellman), and propose a design methodology 
for obtaining high-speed implementations. We show that between the full assembler and 
standard C implementations, there is a design option in which only a small number of 
code segments are written in assembler. These small code segments are the kernel of 3 
arithmetic operations for number-theoretic cryptographic algorithms. We propose eight 
kernel operations. We are currently working on the specification and implementation of 
this cryptographic kernel. 
We have also analyzed the instruction set and related architectural features of the 
Intel Pentium processor and MMX technology for high-speed implementations of number-
theoretic cryptographic algorithms in Chapter 5..  After carefully examining the kernel 
operations for the number-theoretic cryptographic algorithms, we propose new instruc­
tions for the Intel MMX technology. 4 
2. NEW ALGORITHMS FOR MONTGOMERY 
MULTIPLICATION 
2.1.  Introduction 
This chapter discusses several Montgomery multiplication algorithms, two of which 
have been proposed before. We describe three additional algorithms, and analyze in 
detail the space and time requirements of all five methods [20].  These algorithms are 
implemented in C and in assembler. The analyses and actual performance results in­
dicate that the Coarsely Integrated Operand Scanning (CIOS) method, detailed in this 
chapter, is the most efficient of all five algorithms, at least for the general class of pro­
cessor we considered. The Montgomery multiplication methods constitute the core of the 
modular exponentiation operation which is the most popular method used in public-key 
cryptography for encrypting and signing digital data. 
The motivation for studying high-speed and space-efficient algorithms for modular 
multiplication comes from their applications in public-key cryptography. The RSA al­
gorithm [2] and the Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme [3] require the computation of 
modular exponentiation, which is broken into a series of modular multiplications by the 
application of the binary or m-ary methods [5].  Various hardware algorithms for mod­
ular multiplication have been proposed [21, 22, 23]. Modular exponentiation algorithms 
using division chains [24], a double-base number system [25], and complex arithmetic [26] 
are applicable to software implementations. However, these methods concentrate on fast 
modular exponentiation, not on the particular modular multiplication method employed. 
Certainly one of the most interesting and useful advances has been the introduction 
of the so-called Montgomery multiplication algorithm due to Peter L. Mongtomery [8] 
(for some of the recent applications see the discussion by Naccache et al.  [27], Koc et 
al.  [20] and Bajard et al.  [28]). Various hardware implementations of the Montgomery 5 
multiplication have been proposed and some of them have been used in commercially 
available chips [29, 9, 30]. The Montgomery multiplication algorithm is used to speed 
up the modular multiplications and squarings required during the exponentiation process. 
The Montgomery algorithm computes 
MonPro(a, b) = a  b r-1 mod n  (2.1) 
given a, b < n and r such that gcd(n, r) = 1. Even though the algorithm works for any 
r which is relatively prime to n, it is more useful when r is taken to be a power of 2. 
In this case, the Montgomery algorithm performs divisions by a power of 2, which is 
an intrinsically fast operation on general-purpose computers, e.g., signal processors and 
microprocessors; this leads to a simpler implementation than ordinary modular multipli­
cation, which is typically faster as well [27]. 
In this chapter, we study the operations involved in the computing the Mont­
gomery product, describe several high-speed and space-efficient algorithms for computing 
MonPro(a, b), and analyze their time and space requirements. Our focus is to collect 
together several alternatives for Montgomery multiplication, three of which are new. 
2.2.  Montgomery Multiplication 
Let the modulus n be a k-bit integer, i.e., 2k-1 < n < 2k, and let r be 2k. The 
Montgomery multiplication algorithm requires that r and n be relatively prime, i.e., 
gcd(r, n) = gcd(2k, n) = 1. This requirement is satisfied if n is odd. A modified Mont­
gomery multiplication has also been introduced for an even modulus [31].  In order to 
describe the Mongtomery multiplication algorithm, we first define the n-residue of an 
integer a < n as a = a r  (mod n). It is straightforward to show that the set 
{ armodn I 0 <a<n-1 6 
is a complete residue system, i.e., it contains all numbers between 0 and n  1.  Thus, 
there is one-to-one correspondence between the numbers in the range 0 and n  1 and the 
numbers in the above set. The Montgomery reduction algorithm exploits this property 
by introducing a much faster multiplication routine which computes the n-residue of the 
product of the two integers whose n-residues are given. Given two n-residues a and b, the 
Montgomery product is defined as the n-residue 
-e = a  r-1  (mod n)  ,  (2.2) 
where r-1 is the inverse of r modulo n, i.e., it is the number with the property r-1 r = 1 
(mod n). The resulting number c in (2.2) is the n-residue of the product c= ab (mod n), 
since 
a b 7--1  (mod n) 
a-r -br r-1  (mod n,) 
c r  (mod n)  . 
In order to describe the Montgomery reduction algorithm, we need an additional quantity, 
n', which is the integer with the property r  r-1  n n' = 1. The integers r-1 and n' 
can both be computed by the extended Euclidean algorithm [5, 32]. The computation of 
MonPro(a, b) is achieved as follows: 
function MonPro(a, 
Step 1. t:= a 6 
Step 2. u := (t  (t  n' mod r)  n)/r 
Step 3. if u > n then return u  n else return u 
Multiplication modulo r and division by r are both intrinsically fast operations, since r 
is a power of 2. Thus the Montgomery product algorithm is potentially faster and sim­
pler than ordinary computation of a  b mod n, which involves division by n. However, 7 
since conversion from an ordinary residue to an n-residue, computation of n', and con­
version back to an ordinary residue are time-consuming, it is not a good idea to use the 
Montgomery product computation algorithm when a single modular multiplication is to 
be performed. It is more suitable when several modular multiplications with respect to 
the same modulus are needed. Such is the case when one needs to compute modular 
exponentiation. Using the binary method for computing the powers [5], we replace the 
exponentiation by a series of square and multiplication operations modulo n. Let j be 
the number of bits in the exponent e. The following exponentiation algorithm is one way 
to compute x := a' mod n with 0(j) calls to the Montgomery multiplication algorithm. 
Step 4 of the modular exponentiation algorithm computes x using -± via the property of 
the Montgomery algorithm: MonPro(  1) = ±  1  r-1 = x r  = x mod n. 
function ModExp(a, e, n) 
Step 1.  := a r mod n 
Step 2.  := 1  r mod n 
Step 3.  for i = j  1 downto 0 
:=MonPro(-±, ±) 
if ei =1 then -± :=MonPro(, a) 
Step 4.  ret x :=MonPro(±-, 1) 
In typical implementations, large numbers are stored by breaking the numbers into 
words. If w is the wordsize of the computer, then a number can be thought of as a sequence 
of integers each represented in radix W = 2'. If these "multi-precision" numbers require 
s words in the radix W representation, then we take r as r = 2'. 
In the following sections, we give several algorithms for doing the Montgomery 
multiplication MonPro(a, b), and analyze their time and space requirements. We counted 
the total number of multiplications, additions (subtractions), and memory read and write 
operations in terms of the input size parameter s for the time analysis. For example, the 
following operation 8 
(C,S)  := th+j] + a[j]*b[i] + C 
is assumed to require three memory reads, two additions, and one multiplication since 
most microprocessors multiply two one-word numbers, leaving the two-word result in one 
or two registers.' 
Multi-precision integers are assumed to reside in memory throughout the computa­
tions. Therefore, the assignment operations performed within a routine correspond to the 
read or write operations between a register and memory. They are counted to calculate 
the proportion of the memory access time in the total running time of the Montgomery 
multiplication algorithm. In our analysis, loop establishment and index computations are 
not taken into account. The only registers we assume are available are those to hold the 
carry C and the sum S as above (or equivalently, borrow and difference for subtraction). 
Obviously, in many microprocessors there will be more registers, but this gives a first-order 
approximation to the running time, sufficient for a general comparison of the approaches. 
Actual implementation on particular processors gives a more detailed comparison. 
The space analysis is performed by counting the total number of words used as the 
temporary space. However, the space required to keep the input and output values a, b, 
n, no, and u is not taken into account. 
2.3.  Algorithms 
There are a variety of ways to perform the Montgomery multiplication, just as there 
are many ways to multiply. Our purpose in this chapter is to give fairly broad coverage 
of the alternatives. 
Roughly speaking, we may organize the algorithms based on two factors [20]. The 
first factor is whether multiplication and reduction are separated or integrated.  In the 
INVe note that in some processors the additions may actually involve two instructions each, since the 
value +a [j] *b [ii is double-precision; we ignore this distinction in our timing estimates. 9 
separated approach, we first multiply a and b, then perform a Montgomery reduction. 
In the integrated approach, we alternate between multiplication and reduction.  This 
integration can be either coarse-grained or fine-grained, depending on how often we switch 
between multiplication and reduction (i.e., after processing an array of words, or just one 
word); there are implementation tradeoffs between alternatives. 
The second factor is the general form of the multiplication and reduction steps. 
One form is the operand scanning, where an outer loop moves through words of one of 
the operands; another form is product scanning, where the loop  moves through words of 
the product itself [17]. This factor is independent of the first; moreover, it is also possible 
for multiplication to have one form and reduction to have the other form,  even in the 
integrated approach. 
In all the cases we consider, the algorithms are described as operations on multi-
precision numbers. Thus it is straightforward to rewrite the algorithms in an arbitrary 
radix, e.g., in binary or radix-4 form for hardware. 
Clearly, the foregoing discussion suggests that quite a few algorithms are possible, 
but in this chapter we focus on five as representative of the whole set, and which for 
the most part have good implementation characteristics. The five algorithms we discuss 
include the following: 
Separated Operand Scanning (SOS) (Section 2.3.1.) 
Coarsely Integrated Operand Scanning (CIOS) (Section 2.3.2.) 
Finely Integrated Operand Scanning (FIOS) (Section 2.3.3.) 
Finely Integrated Product Scanning (FIPS) (Section 2.3.4.) 
Coarsely Integrated Hybrid Scanning (CIHS) (Section 2.3.5.) 
Other possibilities are variants of one or more of these five;  we encourage the interested 
reader to construct and evaluate some of them. Two of these methods have been described 
previously, SOS (as Improvement 1 in [18]) and FIPS (in [17]). The other three, while 10 
suggested by previous work, have been first described in detail or analyzed in comparison 
with the others in [20]. 
2.3.1.  The Separated Operand Scanning (SOS) Method 
The first method to be analyzed for computing MonPro(a, b) is what  we call the 
Separated Operand Scanning method (see Improvement 1 in [18]). In this method we first 
compute the product a b using 




for j=0 to  s-1 
(C,S) := t[i+j] + a[j]*b[i] + C 
t [i+j]  := S 
t [i+s]  := C 
where t is initially assumed to be zero. The final value obtained is the 2s-word integer t 
residing in words 
t [O] ,  t  ,  ,  t [2s-1] 
Then we compute u using the formula u := (t  m n)/r, where m := t  n' mod r. In 
order to compute u, we first take u = t, and then add m n to it using the standard 
multiplication routine, and finally divide it by r = 25" which is accomplished by ignoring 
the lower s words of u. Since m = t  n' mod r and the reduction process proceeds word 
by word, we can use no = n' mod 2' instead of n'. This observation was first made in 
[18], and applies to all five methods presented in this chapter. Thus, after t is computed 
by multiplying a and b using the above code, we proceed with the following code which 
updates t in order to compute t + m n. 




m  : = t [i.] *n' [0] mod W 
for j=0 to s-1 
(C,S)  := t[i+j] + m*n[j] + C 
t[i+j]  := S 
ADD (t [i+s] ,C) 
The ADD function shown above performs a carry propagation adding C to the input array 
given by the first argument, starting from the first element (t Ci+s] ), and propagates it 
until no further carry is generated. The ADD function is needed for carry propagation up 
to the last word of t, which increases the size of t to 2s words and a single bit. However, 
this bit is saved in a single word, increasing the size of t to 2s + 1 words.2 The computed 
value of t is then divided by r which is realized by simply ignoring the lower s words of t. 
These steps are given below: 
for j=0 to s
 
u[j]  := t [j+s]
 
Finally we obtain the number u in s +1 words. The multi-precision subtraction in Step 3 
of MonPro is then performed to reduce u if necessary. Step 3 can be performed using the 
following code: 
B := 0 
for i=0 to s-1 
(B,D)  := u[i]  n[i]  B 
t [i]  := D 
(B,D) := u[s]  B 
t [s]  := D 
2This extra bit, and hence an extra word, is required in all the methods described. One way to avoid 
the extra word in most cases is to defines as the length in words of 2n, rather than the modulus n itself. 
This s will be the same as in the current definition, except when the length of n is a multiple of the word 
size, and in that case only one larger than currently. 12 
if B=0 then return t [0]  ,  t [1] ,  .  ,  t [s-1]
 
else return u[0] ,  ,  .  u[s-1]
 ,
 
Step 3 is performed in the same way for all algorithms described in this chapter, and thus, 
we do not repeat this step in the description of the algorithms. However, its time and 
space requirements will be taken into account. The operations above contain 2(s + 1) 
additions, 2(s + 1) reads, and s + 1 writes. 
A brief inspection of the SOS method, based on our techniques for counting the 
number of operations, shows that it requires 2s2 +s multiplications, 432 +4s +2 additions, 
6s2 + 7s + 3 reads, and 2s2 + 6s + 2 writes. (See Section 2.4. for discussion of how to 
count the number of operations required by the ADD function.) Furthermore, the SOS 
method requires a total of 2s + 2 words for temporary results, which are used to store 
the (2s + 1)-word array t and the one-word variable m. The SOS method is illustrated in 
Figure 2.1 for .9 = 4. 
FIGURE 2.1: The Separated Operand Scanning (SOS) method for s = 4. The multipli­
cation operation t = a x b is illustrated on the left. Then, no is multiplied by each word
of t to find m. The final result is obtained by adding the shifted  n x m to t, as shown
on the right. 
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 13 
The value no, which is defined as the inverse of the least significant word of n 
modulo 2', i.e., no  (mod 2"), can be computed using a very simple algorithm 
given in [18]. Furthermore, the reason for separating the product computation a  b from 
the rest of the steps for computing u is that when a = b, we can optimize the Montgomery 
multiplication algorithm for squaring. The optimization of squaring is achieved because 
almost half of the single-precision multiplications can be skipped since a2 ai = aj a2. The 
following simple code replaces the first part of the Mongtomery multiplication algorithm 
in order to perform the optimized Montgomery squaring: 
for i=0 to s-1 
(C,S)  := t[i+i] + 
for j=i+1 to s-1 
(C,S)  := t[i+j] + 2*a[j]*a[i] + C 
t[i+j] := S 
t[i+s] := C 
(One tricky part here is that the value 2*a[j]*a[i] requires  more than two words to 
store; if the C value does not have an extra bit, then one way to deal with this is to 
rewrite the loop so that the a [ j ] *a [i] terms are added first, without the multiplication 
by 2; the result is then doubled and the a [1] *a [1] terms are added in.) In this chapter, 
we analyze only the Montgomery multiplication algorithms. The analysis of Montgomery 
squaring can be performed similarly. 
2.3.2.  The Coarsely Integrated Operand Scanning (CIOS) Method 
The next method, the Coarsely Integrated Operand Scanning method, improves on 
the first one by integrating the multiplication and reduction steps.  Specifically, instead 
of computing the entire product a  b, then reducing, we alternate between iterations of 
the outer loops for multiplication and reduction. We can do this since the value of m in 
the ith iteration of the outer loop for reduction depends only on the value t [i]  ,  which is 14 
completely computed by the ith iteration of the outer loop for the multiplication. This 
leads to the following algorithm: 
for 1=0 to s-1 
C := 0 
for j=0 to s-1 
(C,S)  := t [j] + a [j]*b [i] + C 
t [j]  := S 
(C,S)  := t [s] + C 
t [s]  := S 
t [s+1]  := C 
C := 0 
m := t [0] *n' [0] mod W 
for j=0 to s-1 
(C,S)  := t [j] + m*n[j] + C 
t [j]  := S 
(C,S) := t [s] + C 
t [s]  := S 
t [s+1]  := t [s+1] + C 
for j=0 to s 
t [j]  := t [j+1] 
Note that the array t is assumed to be set to 0 initially. The last j-loop is used  to shift 
the result one word to the right (i.e., division by 2w), hence the references to t [j] and 
t [0] instead of t [i+j] and t [1]. A slight improvement is to integrate the shifting into 
the reduction as follows: 
m : = t [0] *n' [O] mod W
 
(C , S)  := t [0] + m*n [0]
 
for j=1 to s-1
 15 
(C,S)  := t [j] + m*ri [j] + C 
t [j-1]  := S 
(C,S)  := t[s] + C 
t [s-1]  := S 
t [s]  := t [s+1] + C 
The auxiliary array t uses only s + 2 words.  This is due to fact that the shifting is 
performed one word at a time, rather than s words at once, saving s 1 words. The final 
result is in the first s +1 words of array t. A related method, without the shifting of the 
array (and hence with a larger memory requirement), is described as Improvement 2 in 
[18]. 
The CIOS method (with the slight improvement above) requires 232 + s multiplica­
tions, 432 + 4s + 2 additions, 6s2 + 7s + 2 reads, and 2s2 + 5s + 1 writes, including the 
final multi-precision subtraction, and uses s + 3 words of memory space. The memory 
reduction is a significant improvement over the SOS method. 
We say that the integration in this method is "coarse" because it alternates between 
iterations of the outer loop. In the next method, we will alternate between iterations of 
the inner loop. 
2.3.3.  The Finely Integrated Operand Scanning (FIOS) Method 
This method integrates the two inner loops of the CIOS method into  one by com­
puting the multiplications and additions in the same loop. The multiplications a3  b, and 
m n3 are computed in the same loop, and then added to form the final t. In this case, 
to must be computed before entering into the loop since m depends on this value which 
corresponds to unrolling the first iteration of the loop for j = 0. 
for 1=0 to s-1
 
(C,S) := t [0] + a[0]*b [1]
 
ADD (t [1] ,C)
 
m := S*n' [O] mod W
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(C,S)  := S + m*n[0] 
The partial products of a  b are computed one by one for each value of i, then 771  n is 
added to the partial product. This sum is then shifted right one word, making t ready for 
the next i-iteration. 
for j=1 to s-1
 
(C,S)  := t [j] + a[j] *b[i] + C
 
ADD (t [j+1] 
(C,S) := S + m*n[j] 
t[j-1]  := S 
(C,S) := t[s] + C 
t[s--1]  := S 
t [s]  := t [s+1] + C 
t[s+1] := 0 
The difference between the CIOS method and this method is that the FIOS method 
has only one inner loop. We illustrate the algorithm in Figure 2.2 for s = 4. The use of 
the ADD function is required in the inner j-loop since there are two distinct carries, one 
arising from the multiplication of aj  bi and the other from the multiplication of in  n3. 
(Thus the benefit of having only one loop is counterbalanced by the requirement of the 
ADD function.) The array t is assumed to be set to 0 initially. 
The FIOS method requires 232+s multiplications, 5s2 +38+2 additions, 782 +5s+2 
reads, and 3s2 + 4s + 1 writes, including the final multi-precision subtraction. This is 
about s2 more additions, writes, and reads than for the CIOS method. The total amount 
of temporary space required is s + 3 words. 
2.3.4.  The Finely Integrated Product Scanning (FIPS) Method 
Like the previous one, this method interleaves the computations a b and in n, but 
here both computations are in the product-scanning form. The method keeps the values 17 
FIGURE 2.2: An iteration of the Finely Integrated Operand Scanning (FIOS) method. 
The computation of partial product t(')  = a x b, ,  illustrated on the left, enables the 
computation of m(2) in that iteration. Then an intermediate result t(i+1)  is found by 
adding n x m(1) to this partial product, as shown on the right. 
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of m and u in the same s-word array m. This method was described in [17] and is related 
to Improvement 3 in [18]. The first loop given below computes one part of the product 
a b and then adds m n to it. The three-word array t, i.e., 
t [0] ,  t [1] ,  t [2] , 
is used as the partial product accumulator for the products a b and m n.3 
for 1=0 to s-1 
for j=0 to 1-1 
(C,S)  := t [0] + a[j]*b[i-j] 
ADD(t [1] ,C) 
(C,5)  := S + m[j]*n[i-j] 
t [0]  := S 
ADD(t [1] ,C) 
3The use of a three-word array assumes that s < 1/17; in general, we need logw(sW(W 1))  2+logw s 
words. The algorithm is easily modified to handle a larger accumulator. 18 




m[i]  := S*n' [0] mod W
 




t [0]  := t[1]
 
t [1]  := t[2]
 
t [2]  := 0
 
In this loop, the ith word of m is computed using no, and then the least significant word of 
m n is added to t. Since the least significant word of t always becomes zero, the shifting 
can be carried out one word at a time in each iteration. The array t is assumed to be set 
to 0 initially. 
The second i-loop, given below, completes the computation by forming the final 
result u word by word in the memory space of m. 
for i=s to 2s-1 
for j=i-s+1 to s-1
 




(C,S)  := S + m[j]*n [i-j]
 




m[i-s]  := t [0] 
m[i-s+1]  := t [1] 
t [0]  := t [1] 
t [1]  := t [2] 
t [2]  := 0 19 
An inspection of indices in the second i-loop shows that the least significant s words of 
the result u are located in the variable m. The most significant bit is in t [0]. (The values 
t [1] and t [2] are zero at the end.) 
The FIPS method requires 2s2 + s multiplications, 682 + 2s + 2 additions, 9s2 +8s +2 
reads, and 5s2 + 8s + 1 writes. The number of additions, reads and writes is somewhat 
more than for the previous methods, but the number of multiplications is the same. The 
method nevertheless has considerable benefits on digital signal processors, as discussed 
in Section 2.4.. (Note that many of the reads and writes are for the accumulator words, 
which may be in registers.) The space required is s + 3 words. 
2.3.5.  The Coarsely Integrated Hybrid Scanning (CIHS) Method 
This method is a modification of the SOS method, illustrating yet another approach 
to Montgomery multiplication. As was shown, the SOS method requires 2s + 2 words to 
store the temporary variables t and m. Here we show that it is possible to use only s + 3 
words of temporary space, without changing the general flow of the algorithm. We call it 
a "hybrid scanning" method because it mixes the product-scanning and operand-scanning 
forms of multiplication. (Reduction is just in the operand-scanning form.) First, we split 
the computation of a b into two loops. The second loop shifts the intermediate result one 
word at a time at the end of each iteration. 
The splitting of multiplication is possible because m is computed by multiplying the 
ith word of t by no. Thus, the multiplication a  b can be simplified by postponing the 
word multiplications required for the most significant half of t to the second i-loop. The 
multiplication loop can be integrated into the second main i-loop, computing one partial 
product in each iteration and reducing the space for the t array to s + 2 words from 2s + 1 
words. In the first stage, (n  j) words of the jth partial product of a b are computed 
and added to t. In Figure 2.3, the computed parts of the partial products are shown by 
straight lines, and the added result is shown by shaded blocks. This computation can be 
performed using the following code: 20 




for j=0 to s-i-1
 
(C,S)  := t  + a[j]*b[i] + C 
t[i +j]  := S 
(C,S)  := t[s] + C 
t [s]  := S 
t [s+1]  := C 
FIGURE 2.3: An iteration of the the Coarsely Integrated Hybrid Scanning (CIHS) method 
for s = 4. The left-hand side figure shows the accumulation of the right half of the partial
products of a x b which is performed in the first i-loop. The second i-loop is depicted
in two parts in the middle and the right. The addition of n x m to t and the shifting
of t+rn x n are illustrated in the middle, which are performed in the first j-loop of the 
second i-loop. The computation of the remaining words of the partial products of a x b is
illustrated on the right-hand side. Each (PC,PS) pair is the sum of the columns connected 
with lines. As illustrated in the bottom of the middle part, the (PC,PS) pair is added to 
t(i), which is performed in the last j-loop. 
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The multiplication of m n is then interleaved with the addition a b m n. The division 
by r is performed by shifting one word at a time within the i-loop. Since m is one word 21 
long and the product rn  C is two words long, the total sum t + in n needs at most 71 
.s + 2 words. Also note that the carry propagation into the sth word is performed into the 
(s  1)st word after the shifting. The array t is assumed to be set to 0 initially. 
for i=0 to s-1
 
m := t [0] *n' [0] mod W
 
(C,S)  := t [0] + m*n [0]
 
for j=1 to s-1
 
(C,S)  := t [j] + m*n[j] + C 
t [j-1]  := S
 
(C,S) := t [s] + C
 
t [s-1]  := S
 
(C,S) := t [s+1] + C
 
t [s]  := S
 
t [s+1]  := C
 
The computation of m requires the use of to instead of ti, as in the original SOS algorithm. 
This is due to the shifting of t in each iteration. The two excess words computed in the 
first loop are used in the following j-loop which computes the (s + i)th word of a  b. 
for j=i+1 to s-1
 
(C,S)  := t [s-1] + b[j]*a[s-j+i]
 
t [s-1]  := S
 
(C,S)  := t [s] + C
 
t [s]  := S
 
t [s+1]  := t [s+1] + C
 
We note that the above four lines compute the most significant three words of t, i.e., the 
(s  1)st, sth, and (s + 1)st words of t. The above code completes Step 1 of MonPro(a, b). 
After this, 71 is subtracted from t if t > rt. We illustrate the algorithm in Figure 3 for 22 
Montgomery multiplication of two four-word numbers. Here, the symbols PC and PS 
denote the two extra words required to obtain the correct (s + i)th word. Each PC, PS 
pair is the sum of their respective words connected by vertical dashed lines in Figure 3. 
The number of multiplications required in this method is also equal to 2s2 + s. However, 
the number of additions decreases to 482 + 4s + 2. The number of reads is 6.5s2 + 6.5s + 2 
and the number of writes is 3s2 + 5s +1. As was mentioned earlier, this algorithm requires 
s + 3 words of temporary space. 
2.4.  Results and Conclusions 
The algorithms presented in this chapter require the same number of single-precision 
multiplications, however, the number of additions, reads and writes are slightly different. 
There seems to be a lower bound of 4s2 + 4s + 2 for addition operations. The SOS and 
CIOS methods reach this lower bound. The number of operations and the amount of 
temporary space required by the methods are summarized in Table 2.1. The total number 
of operations is calculated by counting each operation within a loop, and multiplying this 
number by the iteration count. As an example we illustrate the calculation for the CIOS 
method in Table 2.2. 
We note that the ADD (x [i] , C)  function, which implements the operation x [i]  := 
x [1] + C including the carry propagation, requires one memory read (x [i] ), one addition 
(x [1] +C) and one memory write (x [i] : =) operation during the first step. Considering 
the carry propagation from this addition, on average one additional memory read, one 
addition, and one memory write is performed (in addition to the branching and loop 
instructions). Thus, the ADD function is counted as two memory reads, two additions, and 
two memory writes in our analysis. 
Clearly, our counting is only a first-order approximation; we are not taking into 
account the full use of registers to store intermediate values, cache size in the data and 23 
TABLE 2.1: The time and space requirements of the methods. 
Method  Multiplications  Additions  Reads  Writes  Space 
SOS  2s2 + 8  432 + 4s + 2  6s2 + 7s + 3  232+6s+2  2s+2 
CIOS  232 + s  432 + 4s + 2  6s2 + 7s + 2  2s2 + 5s + 1  s + 3 
FIOS  2s2 + 8  582 + 3s + 2  732 + 53 + 2  332 + 4s + 1  s + 3 
FIPS  2s2 + s  632 + 2s + 2  932 + 8s + 2  532 + 8s + 1  s + 3 
CIHS  232 + s  4s2 + 4s + 2  6.5s2 + 6.5s + 2  3s2 + 5s + 1  s + 3 
instruction misses, and the special instructions such as multiply and accumulate. We also 
did not count loop overhead, pointer arithmetic, and the like, which will undoubtedly 
affect performance. 
In order to measure the actual performance of these algorithms, we implemented 
them in C and in Intel 386-family assembler on an Intel Pentium-60 Linux system. Ta­
ble 2.3 summarizes the timings of these methods for s = 16, 32, 48, and 64. These cor­
respond to 512, 1024, 1536, and 2048 bits since w = 32.  The timing values given in 
Table 2.3 are in milliseconds, and are the average values over several thousand executions. 
The timing values given in Table 2.3 are in milliseconds, and are the average values over 
one thousand executions including the overhead of the loop that calls the MonPro func­
tion. The table also contains the compiled object code sizes of each algorithm which is 
important when the principles of locality and instruction cache size are considered. 
In the C version of the functions, the single-precision (32-bit) multiplications are 
realized by dividing them into two 16-bit words. The C version of the function has more 
overhead compared to the assembler version, in which 32-bit multiplication operations 
are carried out using a single assembler instruction. The assembler version of the ADD 24 
TABLE 2.2: Calculating the operations of the CIOS method. 
Operation 
STATEMENT  Mult  Add  Read  Write  Iterations 
for i=0 to s-1  - - ­
C := 0  0 0 0  0 S 
for j=0 to s-1  ­
(C,S)  := t [j] + b[j] *a[i] + C  1  2  3  0  s2 
t[i] := S  0 0  0  1  s2 
(C,S)  := t [s] + C  0  1  1  0  S
 
t [s] := S  0 0  0  1  S
 
t [s+1] := C  0 0  0  1  S
 
m := t [0] *n ' [0] mod W  1  0  2  1  s
 
(C,S)  := t[o] + m*n [0]  1  1  3  0  S
 
for j=1 to s-1  - - - - ­
(C,S)  := t[j] + m*n[j] + c  1  2  3  0 s(s 1) 
t[j -1] := S  0  0  0  1  s(s  1) 
(C,S)  := t [s] + C  0  1  1  0  s 
t [5-1] := S  0 0  0  1  S 
t [s]  := t [s+1] + C  0  1  1  1  s 
Final Subtraction  0  2(s + 1)  2(s + 1)  s +1  1 
2s2 + 8  482 + 4s + 2  6s2 + 7s + 2  2s2 + 5s + 1 
function is optimized to use one 32-bit register for addition and a 32-bit register for 
address computation. The propagation of the carry is performed using the carry flag. 
The CIOS and FIOS methods are similar to one another in their use of embedded 
shifting and interleaving the products a,  b and m n3. The only difference is that CIOS 
method computes the partial product a, b by using a separate j-loop. Then, the accumu­
lation of m ni to this partial product is performed in the succeeding j-loop. The FIOS 
method combines the computation of partial product a,  b and accumulation of a2  b and 
m n3 in one single j-loop, thereby obligating the use of the ADD function for propagation 
of two separate carries. 
The CIOS algorithm operates faster on the selected processor compared to the 25 
TABLE 2.3: The timing values of Mon Pro in milliseconds on a Pentium-60 Linux system. 
The assembly code is for the Intel 386 family; further improvements may be possible by
exploiting particular features of the Pentium. 
512 bits  1024 bits  1536 bits  2048 bits  Code size (bytes) 
Method  C  ASM  C  ASM  C  ASM  C  ASM  C  ASM 
SOS  1.376  0.153  5.814  0.869  13.243  2.217  23.567  3.968  1084  1144 
CIOS  1.249  0.122  5.706  0.799  12.898  1.883  23.079  3.304  1512  1164 
FIOS  1.492  0.135  6.520  0.860  14.550  2.146  26.234  3.965  1876  1148 
FIPS  1.587  0.149  6.886  0.977  15.780  2.393  27.716  4.310  2832  1236 
CIHS  1.662  0.151  7.268  1.037  16.328  2.396  29.284  4.481  1948  1164 
other Montgomery multiplication algorithms, especially when implemented in assembly 
language. However, on other classes of processor, a different algorithm may be preferable. 
For instance, on a digital signal processor, we have often found the FIPS method to 
be better because it exploits the "multiply-accumulate" architecture typical with such 
processors, where a set of products are added together. On such architectures, the three 
words t[0], t[1] and t[2] are stored in a single hardware accumulator, and the product 
a [.j]*b [i-j] in the FIPS j-loop can be added directly to the accumulator, which makes 
the j-loop very fast. 
Dedicated hardware designs will have additional tradeoffs, based on the extent to 
which the methods can be parallelized; we do not make any recommendations here, but 
refer the reader to Even's description of a systolic array as one example of such a design 
[33]. On a general-purpose processor, the CIOS algorithm is probably the best, as it is the 
simplest of all five methods, and it requires fewer additions and fewer assignments than 
the other four methods. The CIOS method requires only s + 3 words of temporary space, 
which is just slightly more than half the space required by the SOS algorithm. 26 
3. MONTGOMERY MULTIPLICATION IN GF(2k) 
3.1.  Introduction 
Arithmetic operations in the Galois field GF(2k) have several applications in coding 
theory, computer algebra, and cryptography. We are especially interested in cryptographic 
applications where k is very large. Examples of the cryptographic applications are the 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm [3] based on the discrete exponentiation and elliptic 
curve cryptosystems [34, 11, 12, 35] over the field GF(2k). The Diffie-Hellman algorithm 
requires computation of ge, where g is a fixed primitive element of the field and e is an 
integer. In elliptic curves, the exponentiation operation is used to compute inverse of an 
element in GF(2k), based on Fermat's identity a-1 = a2k -2 [14, 15, 16, 36]. 
Cryptographic applications require fast hardware and software implementations of 
the arithmetic operations in GF(2k) for large values of k. The most important advance in 
this field has been the Massey-Omura algorithm [37] which is based on the normal bases. 
Subsequently, the optimal normal bases were introduced [38], and their hardware [39, 40] 
and software [41, 42] implementations were given. While hardware implementations are 
compact and fast, they are also inflexible and expensive. The change of the underlying field 
in a hardware implementation requires a complete redesign. Software implementations, 
on the other hand, are perhaps slower, but they are cost-effective and flexible, i.e., the 
algorithms and the field parameters can easily be modified without requiring redesign. 
Recently, there has been a growing interest to develop software methods for implementing 
GF(2k) arithmetic operations for cryptographic and coding applications [42, 43, 44, 45, 10]. 
We show that the multiplication operation c = a b r-1 in the field GF(2k) can be 
implemented significantly faster in software than the standard multiplication, where r is a 
special fixed element of the field [19, 46]. This operation is the finite field analogue of the 
Montgomery multiplication for modular multiplication of integers. We give the bit-level 27 
and word-level algorithms for computing the product, perform a thorough performance 
analysis, and compare the algorithm to the standard multiplication algorithm in GF(2k). 
We also present a new algorithm for computing ae where a E GF(2k) and e is an 
integer. The proposed algorithm is more suitable for implementation in software, and relies 
on the Montgomery multiplication in GF(2k). The speed of the exponentiation algorithm 
largely depends on the availability of a fast method for multiplying two polynomials of 
length w defined over GF(2). The theoretical analysis and our experiments indicate that 
the proposed exponentiation method is about 6 times faster than the exponentiation 
method using the standard multiplication when w = 8. Furthermore, the availability of 
a 32-bit GF(2) polynomial multiplication instruction on the underlying processor would 
make the new exponentiation algorithm up to 37 times faster. 
3.2.  Polynomial Representation 
The elements of the field GF(2k) can be represented in several different ways [47, 
48, 49]. We find the polynomial representation useful and suitable for software imple­
mentation. The algorithm for the Montgomery multiplication described in this study is 
based on the polynomial representation. According to this representation an element a of 
GF(2k) is a polynomial of length k, i.e., of degree less than or equal to k  1, written as 
k-1 
a(x) =  aixt = ak_ixk-1  ak_2xk-2 +  + aix  a() 
i=o 
where the coefficients a, E GF(2). These coefficients are also referred as the bits of a, and 
the element a is represented as a = (ak_iak_2... alao). In the word-level description of 
the algorithms, we partition these bits into blocks of equal length. Let w be the wordsize 
of the computer. We assume that k = sw, and write a as an sw-bit number consisting of 
s blocks, where each block is of length w. If k is less than sw (and more than (s  1)w), 
then we pad the high-order bits of the most significant block with zero and take k as sw. 28 
Thus, we write a as a = (As_iAs_2 ... Ai A0), where each Ai is of length w such that 
Ai = (aiw+w-1aiw+w-2  aiw+laiw) 
In the polynomial case, this is equivalent to 
a(x) =  Ai(x)xlw = As_1(x)x(3-1)" + As-2(x)x(s-2)w +  + Ai (x)xw + Ao(x) 
i=o 
where A1(x) is a polynomial of length w such that 
w-i 
Ai (x) =  ajw±iii = ajw+w-1XW-1  ajw+w-2X113-2 +  + ajw+lx  ajw 
3=o 
The addition of two elements a and b in GF(2k) are performed by adding the polynomials 
a(x) and b(x), where the coefficients are added in the field GF(2). This is equivalent to 
bit-wise XOR operation on the vectors a and b. In order to multiply two elements a and 
b in GF(2k), we need an irreducible polynomial of degree k. Let n(x) be an irreducible 
polynomial of degree k over the field GF(2). The product c = a b in GF(2k) is obtained 
by computing 
c(x) = a(x)b(x) mod n(x)  , 
where c(x) is a polynomial of length k, representing the element c E GF(2k). Thus, the 
multiplication operation in the field GF(2k) is accomplished by multiplying the corre­
sponding polynomials modulo the irreducible polynomial n(x). 
3.3.  Montgomery Multiplication in GF(2k) 
Instead of computing a  b in GF(2k), we propose to compute a  b r-1 in GF(2k), 
where r is a special fixed element of GF(2k). A similar idea was proposed by Montgomery 
in [8] for modular multiplication of integers. We show that Montgomery's technique is 
applicable to the field GF(2k) as well. The selection of r(x) = xk turns out to be very useful 
in obtaining fast software implementations. Thus, r is the element of the field, represented 29 
by the polynomial r(x) mod n(x)  .  The Montgomery multiplication method requires that 
r(x) and n(x) are relatively prime, i.e., gcd(r(x),n(x)) = 1. For this assumption to hold, 
it suffices that n(x) be not divisible by x. Since n(x) is an irreducible polynomial over the 
field GF(2), this will always be case. Since r(x) and n(x) are relatively prime, there exist 
two polynomials r-1(x) and n'(x) with the property that 
r(x)r-1(x) + n(x)n' (x) = 1,  (3.1) 
where r-1(x) is the inverse of r(x) modulo n (x) .  The polynomials r' (x) and n'(x) 
can be computed using the extended Euclidean algorithm [49, 47].  The Montgomery 
multiplication of a and b is defined as the product 
c(x) = a(x)b(x)r -1(x) mod n(x)  ,  (3.2) 
which can be computed using the following algorithm: 
Algorithm for Montgomery Multiplication
 
Input:  a(x), b(x), r(x), n'(x)
 
Output:  c(x) = a(x)b(x)r-1 (x) mod n(x)
 
Step 1.  t(x) := a(x)b(x)
 
Step 2.  u(x) := t(x)n' (x) mod r(x)
 
Step 3.  c(x) := [t(x) + u(x)n(x)]Ir (x)
 
In order to prove the correctness of the above algorithm, note that u(x) = t(x)n' (x) mod 
r(x) implies that there is a polynomial K(x) over GF(2) with the property 
u(x) = t(x)n' (x) + K (x)r (x)  .  (3.3) 
We write the expression for c(x) in Step 3, and then substitute u(x) with the expression 
(3.3) as 
c(x)  = r(x) [t(x) + u(x)n(x)] 
=
1 
[t(x) + t(x)n' (x)n(x) + K (x)r (x)n(x)] r(x) 30 
Furthermore, we have n' (x)n(x) = 1 + r (x)r-1 (x) according to Equation (3.1). Thus, c(x) 
is computed as follows: 
1 





[t(x)r(x)r -1(x) + K (x)r (x)n(x)]
 T(x) 
t(x)r -1(x) + K (x)n(x)
 
t(x)r-1(x) mod n(x) 
a(x)b(x)r-1(x) mod n(x) , 
as required. The above algorithm is similar to the algorithm given for the Montgomery 
multiplication of integers. The only difference is that the final subtraction step required 
in the integer case is not necessary in the polynomial case. This is proved by showing 
that the degree of the polynomial c(x) computed by this algorithm is less than or equal to 
k  1. Since the degrees of a(x) and b(x) are both less than or equal to k  1, the degree 
of  t(x) = a(x)b(x) will be less than or equal to 2(k  1). Also note that the degrees of 
n(x) and r(x) are both equal to k. The degree of n(x) computed in Step 2 will be strictly 
less than k since the operation is performed modulo r(x). Thus, the degree of c(x) as 
computed in Step 3 of the algorithm is found as 
deg {c(x)}  < max[deg{t(x)}  ,  deg{u(x)} + deg{n(x)}1  deg{r(x)} 
< max[2k  2  ,  k  1 + lc]  k 
< k  1 
Thus, the polynomial c(x) is already reduced. 
3.4.  Computation of Montgomery Multiplication 
The computation of c(x) involves standard multiplications, a modulo r(x) multi­
plication, and a division by r(x). The modular multiplication and division operations in 31 
Steps 2 and 3 are intrinsically fast operations since r(x) = xk.  The remainder operation 
in modular multiplication using the modulus xk is accomplished by simply ignoring the 
terms which have powers of x larger than or equal to  k. Similarly, division of an arbitrary 
polynomial by  xk is accomplished by shifting the polynomial to the right by k places. A 
drawback in computing c(x) is the precomputation of ril(x) required in Step 2. However, 
it turns out the computation of n'(x) can be completely avoided if the coefficients of a(x) 
are scanned one bit at a time. Furthermore, the word-level algorithm requires the com­
putation of only the least significant word NN(x) instead of the whole  ni (x).  In order to 
explain this, we note that the Montgomery product can be written as 
k-1 
c(x) = x-k a(x)b(x) = x  aixib(x)  (mod n(x)). 
The product 
t(x) = (ak_ixk-1 + ak_2xk-2  + aix + ao)b(x) 
can be computed by starting from the most significant digit, and then proceeding to the 
least significant as 
t(x) := 0 
for i = k  1 to 0 
t(x)  t(x) + aib(x) 
t(x)  xt(x) 
The shift factor x-k in x-ka(x)b(x) reverses the direction of summation. Since 
k
 
X  (ak_ixk-1  ak_2xk-2 +  + aix + ao) = 
-1  -2  +
 ak-ix  + ak_2x  +  aix-k+1  aox-k , 
we start processing the coefficients of  a(x) from the least significant, and obtain the 
following bit-level algorithm in order to compute t(x) = a(x)b(x)x-k 
t(x) := 0 32 
for i = 0 to k  1
 
t(x) := t(x) + aib(x)
 
t(x) := t(x) /x
 
This algorithm computes the product t(x) = x-ka(x)b(x), however, we are interested in 
computing c(x) = x-k a(x)b(x) mod n(x). Following the analogy to the integer algorithm, 
we achieve this computation by adding  n(x)  to c(x) if co is  1, making the new c(x) 
divisible by x since  no = 1.  If co is already 0 after the addition step, we do not add 
n(x) to it.  Therefore, we are computing c(x) := c(x) + con(x) after the addition step. 
After this computation, c(x) will always be divisible by x. We can compute c(x)  :=-­
c(x)x-1 mod n(x) by dividing c(x) by x since c(x) = xu(x) implies c(x) = xu(x)x-1 = 
u(x) mod n(x). The bit-level algorithm is given below: 
Bit-Level Algorithm for Montgomery Multiplication 
Step 1.  c(x)  0 
Step 2.  for i = 0 to  k 1 do 
Step 3.  c(x) := c(x) + aib(x) 
Step 4.  c(x) := c(x) + con(x) 
Step 5.  c(x) := c(x)/x 
The bit-level algorithm for the Montgomery multiplication given above is generalized 
to the word-level algorithm by proceeding word by word where the wordsize is w > 2 and 
k = sw. Recall that Ai(x) represents the ith word of the polynomial a(x). The addition 
step is performed by multiplying Ai(x) by b(x) at steps i = 0... (s  1). We then need to 
multiply the partial product c(x) by x' modulo n(x). In this step, we add a multiple of 
n(x) to c(x) so that the least significant w coefficients of c(x) will be zero, i.e., c(x) will be 
divisible by xw. Thus, if c(x)  0 mod xw, then we find M(x) (which is a polynomial of 
length w) such that c(x) + M(x)n(x) = 0  (mod xw). Let Co(x) and No(x) be the least 33 
significant words of c(x) and n(x), respectively. We calculate M(x) as 
M(x) = Co(x)N0-1(x) mod xw 
We note that N0-1(x) mod xi° is equal to Noi(x) since the property (3.1) implies that 
x'x'w + n(x)n,' (x)  =  1  (mod 5w) 
No(x)No(x) =  1  (mod xw) 
The word-level algorithm for the Montgomery multiplication is obtained as 
Word-Level Algorithm for Montgomery Multiplication 
Step 1.  c(x) := 0 
Step 2.  for i = 0 to s  1 do 
Step 3.  c(x)  c(x) + Ai(x)b(x) 
Step 4.  M(x) := Co(x)N6(x)  (mod xw) 
Step 5.  c(x)  c(x) + M(x)n(x) 
Step 6.  c(x)  c(x) I xw 
3.5.  Montgomery Squaring 
The computation of the Montgomery squaring can be optimized due to the fact that 
cross terms disappear because they come in pairs and the ground field is GF(2). It is easy 
to show that 
c(x) = a2(x) 
ak_ix2(k-1)  ak_2x2(k-2) a  + aix2 + a() 
= (ak-iOak_20  Oal0a0)  , 
and thus, the multiplication steps can be skipped. The Montgomery squaring algorithm 
starts with the degree 2(k  1) polynomial c(x) = a2(x), and then reduces c(x) by com­
puting c(x) := c(x)x-k mod n(x). The steps of the word-level algorithm are given below: 34 
Word-Level Algorithm for Montgomery Squaring
 
Step 1.  c(x)  Eik=-01- aix2i
 
Step 2.  for i = 0 to s  1 do
 
Step 3.  M(x) := Co(x)N6(x)  (mod xw)
 
Step 4.  c(x) := c(x) + M(x)n(x)
 
Step 5.  c(x) := c(x)/xw
 
3.6.  Computation of the Inverse 
The word-level algorithm requires the computation of the w-length  polynomial 
N6(x) instead of the entire polynomial n' (x) which is of length k = sw.  It turns out 
that the algorithm introduced in [18] for computing no in the integer case can  also be 
generalized to the polynomial case. The inversion algorithm is based on the observation 
that the polynomial No(x) and its inverse satisfy 
No(x)No-1(x) = 1  (mod xz)  (3.4) 
for i = 1, 2, ... , w. In order to compute N6(x), we start with N(;(x) = 1, and proceed as 
Algorithm for Inversion
 
Step 1.  NN(x) := 1
 
Step 2.  for i -= 2 to w
 
Step 3.  t(x) := No(x)N6(x) mod xi
 
Step 4.  if t(x)  1 then N(x)  N6(x) +
 
3.7.  Montgomery Exponentiation in GF(2k) 
The proposed exponentiation algorithm is based on the Montgomery multiplication 
and squaring operations [50, 51]. Let e be an m-bit integer, where ei E {0,1} is the ith 35 
bit of e for i = 0,1, ... ,m  1. In order to compute c = ae for a given a E GF(2k), we 
first compute the Montgomery images of 1 and a using standard multiplications.  The 
exponentiation algorithm based on the binary method then proceeds to compute c  using 
only the Montgomery squaring and multiplication operations. 
Algorithm for Montgomery Exponentiation
 
Step 1.  := 1  r
 
Step 2.  a: =ar
 
Step 3.  for i = m  1 downto 0 do
 
Step 4.  : = e x E
 
Step 5.  if ei = 1 then 6 :=  x a
 
Step 6.  c := -6 x1
 
The difference of the above algorithm from the binary method using the standard squar­
ing and multiplication operations is that  in Steps 4 and 5, respectively, we perform the 
r. When  Montgomery squaring and multiplication operations.  Initially, we have E = 1 
a Montgomery squaring or a Montgomery multiplication is performed, the multiplicative 
factor r remains in place since 
r  (3.5) cxc = (c r)- (c r)  r-1 = (c  c)
 
E x a =  (c  r)  (a  r) r-1 = (c  a)  r  .  (3.6)
 
We remove this multiplicative factor on E in Step 6 by performing a Montgomery multi­
plication, and obtain 
(3.7) E x 1 = (c r) 1 r-1  c 
In order to perform the Montgomery squaring and multiplication operations, we use the 
algorithm introduced in [19]. This method is based on the polynomial representation of 
the elements of GF(2k), and is particularly suitable for software implementation due to 
the fact that it proceeds in a word-level fashion. 36 
3.8.  Analysis
 
In this section, we give a rigorous analysis of the Montgomery exponentiation al­
gorithm in GF(2k) by calculating the number of word-level operations. The word-level 
GF(2) polynomial addition is simply the bitwise XOR operation which is a readily available 
instruction on most general purpose microprocessors and signal processors. The word-level 
GF(2) polynomial multiplication operation receives two 1-word (w-bit) polynomials a(x) 
and  b(x)  defined over the field GF(2), and computes the 2-word (2w-bit) polynomial 
c(x) = a(x)b(x). For example, given  a = (1101) and b = (1010), this operation computes 
c as 
a(x)b(x)  =  (X3 + X2 + 1)(X3 + X) 
= X6  +X
5 +X4+X 
= (0111 0010) . 
The implementation of this operation, which we call MULGF2, can be performed in 3 dis­
tinctly different ways: 
An instruction on the underlying processor. 
Table lookup approach. 
Emulation using SHIFT and XOR operations. 
In the first approach, the underlying processor has a special MULGF2 instruction as defined 
above. The availability of an instruction to perform this operation would definitely be the 
fastest method. However, none of the general purpose processors contains an instruction 
to perform this operation. 
A simple method for implementing the table lookup approach is to use two tables, 
one for computing the higher (H) and the other for computing the lower (L) bits of the 
product. The tables are addressed using the bits of the operands, and thus, each table is 37 
of size 2' x  x w bits. We obtain the values H and L  in two table reads. However, we note 
that these tables are different from the tables in [41, 43], which are used to implement 
GF(2W) multiplications.  Here we are using the tables to multiply two (w  1)- degree 
polynomials over GF(2) to obtain the polynomial of degree 2(w  1). 
In the emulation approach, two w-bit polynomials A and B are multiplied using shift, 












if BIT(B,j)=1 then L := L XOR A
 
Here  SHL shifts its first operand to the left by the number of bits given in the second 
operand.  RCL is a rotate (circular shift) instruction shifting the first operand to the left 
circularly by the number of bits given in the second operand. 
This algorithm computes the 2-word result using a total of 2w SHIFT/ROTATE and w 
XOR operations. The emulation approach is usually slower than the table lookup approach, 
particularly for w > 8. 
Our analysis is a first-order approximation. We do not consider certain processor 
features such as specialized bit-level instructions (test jth bit), conditional executions 
(delay slots in conditional branches), and conditional data movement instructions. We 
also do not count loop overhead, pointer arithmetic, and the like, which undoubtly affects 
the performance. 
In order to compare the exponentiation algorithms using the standard and the Mont­
gomery multiplications, we count the number of word-level operations required by these 
algorithms [51]. We perform this analysis by fixing the exponentiation method as the 38 
binary method, and taking m as the number of bits in the exponent  e. The standard and 
Montgomery exponentiation algorithms are given in Figure 3.1 below. 
FIGURE 3.1: Exponentiation Algorithms. 
Montgomery Exponentiation 
Step 1.  c := 1  r 
Step 2.  a := a r 
Step 3.  for i = m  1 downto 0 do 
Step 4.  :=  e r-1 
Step 5.  if ei = 1 then c: =  a,  r-1 
Step 6.  c = e 1  r-1 
Standard Exponentiation 
Step 1.  c := 1 
Step 2.  for i = m  1 downto 0 do 
Step 3.  c  c c 
Step 4.  if ei = 1 then c := c a 
The Montgomery exponentiation algorithm relies on the subroutines for computing the 
inverse, the Montgomery squaring and multiplications (in Steps 4 and 5), and  a single 
standard multiplication (in Step 2). We do not need to perform a multiplication in Step 
1. The standard exponentiation algorithm, on the other hand, requires only the standard 
squaring and multiplication subroutines. 39 
The detailed analyses of the word-level Montgomery and standard multiplication 
algorithms are given in [19]. Similar analyses can also be given for the word-level Mont­
gomery and standard squaring algorithms. The number of word-level operations required 
by these algorithms are summarized in Table 3.1. 
TABLE 3.1: Operation counts for the multiplication and squaring algorithms. 
Subroutine  MULGF2  XOR/AND/OR  SHIFT 
Montgomery Multiplication  2s2 + s  4s2  ­
Montgomery Squaring  s2 + s  2s2 + (211) + 1)s  (2w + 1)s 
2  3(2 + r2 Standard Multiplication  s )  + il s  2(w + 1)s2 + (w + 1)s 
Standard Squaring  - 4 52 + (2w + )s  3ws2 + (3w + 1)s 
On the other hand, the inversion algorithm given in Section 5 requires (w  1)  MULGF2, 
(w  1) AND, and (w  1)  SHIFT operations in Step 3.  Assuming the least significant 
coefficient of t(x) is equal 0 with probability 1/2, we obtain the number of XOR and 
SHIFT operations in Step 4 as (w  1)/2 and (w  1)/2, respectively. Using these values 
and Table 3.1, we summarize the operation counts of the exponentiation algorithms in 
Table 3.2. 
In Table 3.3, we summarize the total number of operations required by the Montgomery 
and standard exponentiation algorithms for w = 8,16,32. Table 3.4 tabulates the maxi­
mum speedup of the proposed exponentiation method assuming the word-level operations 
XOR/AND/OR and  SHIFT take nearly the same amount of time. The emulation cost of 
MULGF2 is 2w  SHIFT and w XOR operations in the emulation  case. The cost of MULGF2 40 
TABLE 3.2: Operation counts for the Montgomery and the standard exponentiation. 
Montgomery Exponentiation 
MULGF2  XOR/AND/OR  SHIFT
 
Inversion  w  1  -(w  1)  3 
(71)  1) 
Step 2  s2  3(1 + 1)s2 + 1`22-s  2(w + 1)s2 + (w + 1)s 
Step 4  ms2 + ms  2m,s2 + (2w + 1)ms  (2w + 1)ms 
Step 5  ms2 +12-2-'s  2ms2 
4s2 Step 6  2s2 + 8 
Standard Exponentiation 
Step 3  "ms2 + (2w + Dms  3wms2 + (3w + 1)ms 
m 2 Step 4  2 s (1- + 3ms2 + Ims  (w + 1)ms2 + (2 + -)ms 
instruction is assumed equal to those of SHIFT and XOR operations in the instruction case. 
3.9.  Implementation Results and Conclusions 
We implemented the Montgomery and standard exponentiation algorithms in C, 
and obtained timings on a 100-MHz Intel 486DX4 processor running the NextStep 3.3 
operating system. We executed the exponentiation programs several hundred times and 
obtained the average timings for each k.  The modulus polynomial n(x) is generated 
randomly for k = 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024, 1536, 2048. The exponent is an m-bit integer 
with equal number of 0 and 1 bits. 
The multiplication operation  MULGF2 was implemented using three approaches. In 41 
TABLE 3.3: Comparing the Montgomery and standard exponentiation algorithms for the
number of MULGF2 operations. 
MULGF2  w  Standard  Montgomery 
Emulation  8  70.5ms2 + 49ms  (52m + 109)s2 + (70m + 37)s + 189 
'7  16  138.5ms2 + 95ms  (100m + 209)32 + (138m + 73)s + 765 
,  32  274.5ms2 + 187ms  (196m + 409)s2 + (274m + 145)s + 3069 
Instruction  8  59ms2 + 49ms  (6m + 40)s2 + (35.5m + 14)s + 28 
77  16  115ms2 + 95ms  (6m + 68)32 + (67.5m + 26)s + 60 
77  32  227ms2 + 187ms  (6m + 124)s2 + (131.5m + 50)s + 124 
the first approach, we used the emulation algorithm given in the previous section. 
In the second approach, a lookup table is used for w = 8, as described before. For 
w = 8, each of the tables is of size 64 Kilobytes, which is reasonable. However, for w = 16, 
the table size increases to 216 x 216 x 16 bits, which gives 8 Gigabytes. Therefore, we 
implemented the table lookup MULGF2 operation only for w = 8. 
For w = 16 and w = 32, we implement the MULGF2 operation using a hybrid ap-
TABLE 3.4: Montgomery exponentiation speedup for different  MULGF2 implementations. 
MULGF2-4  Emulation  Instruction 
w  8 16 32 8  16  32 
Speedup  1.36  1.39  1.40  9.83  19.17  37.83 42 
proach: 8-bit tables coupled with emulation to obtain the 16-bit or 32-bit result.  For 
example, 16-bit multiplication using two 8-bit tables is computed as shown below. 
al := SHR(a, 8)
 




b0 := b AND Oxff
 
L := TableL [a0] [b0] XOR SHR(TableH [a0] [bO]
 
XOR TableL [al] [b0] XOR TableL [a0] [bl]  , 8)
 
H := TableH [al] [bO] XOR TableH [a0] [bl]
 
XOR TableL [al] [bi] XOR SHR(TableH [al] [bi] ,8)
 
where TableL and TableH are the 8-bit tables giving the low and high order 8-bits of an 
8-by-8 bit GF(2) polynomial multiplication. The 32-bit hybrid multiplication algorithm 
also uses these 8-bit tables. 
TABLE 3.5: Experimental speedup values of Montgomery exponentiation for m = 128. 
w -4 8  16  32 
k  Tab8  Emu  Hyb8  Emu  Hyb8  Emu 
64  6.32  4.10  6.75  5.00  5.33  3.61 
128  4.85  3.79  4.51  4.20  4.00  3.25 
256  4.95  3.49  4.40  3.60  3.03  2.79 
512  5.66  3.83  3.96  3.35  2.88  2.66 
1024  5.97  4.04  4.22  3.70  2.83  2.44 
1536  6.00  3.95  4.58  3.51  2.69  2.44 
2048  6.05  3.76  4.62  3.89  2.56  2.30 43 
The experimental speedup values are given in Table 3.5. These speedup values are 
obtained by dividing the time elapsed for standard exponentiation by the time elapsed for 
Montgomery exponentiation. Montgomery exponentiation time includes computation of 
N6(x), precomputation of a and -6-, and final computation by 1 to obtain c. 
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3.10.  Conclusions 
As the theoretical results summarized in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 the experimental data 
in Table 3.5 indicate, the Montgomery exponentiation algorithm is about 6 times faster 
than the standard exponentiation for w = 8.  The table lookup approach for w > 16 
seems unrealistic due to the size of the tables. An efficient way to implement the MULGF2 
operation is to add an instruction to the processor to perform this multiplication. The 
availability of such an instruction would yield more speedup than the table lookup  ap­44 
proach, because memory accesses would be eliminated which are required in the table 
lookup approach. For example, the availability of a 32-bit MULGF2 instruction would make 
the Montgomery exponentiation about 37 times faster than the standard exponentiation, 
as seen in Table 3.4. Table 3.2 illustrates a comparative graph of the speedup values for 
Montgomery exponentiation for aforementioned methods. 
The crucial part of the proposed exponentiation algorithm is the Montgomery multi­
plication in GF(2k) introduced in [19]. The computation of the Montgomery multiplication 
in GF(2k) is similar to the one for modular arithmetic. A review of the Montgomery mul­
tiplication algorithms for modular arithmetic is given in [20]. We are currently analyzing 
these algorithms, and comparing their time and space requirements for performing the 
Montgomery multiplication operation in GF(2k). Another possible avenue of research is 
to compare the proposed exponentiation method to the one which uses trinomials and the 
normal basis. The squaring operation in the normal basis is trivial, however, the software 
implementation of the multiplication is more complicated. 45 






4.1.  Introduction 
Because of their flexibility and cost effectiveness, software implementations of num­
ber-theoretic cryptographic algorithms (e.g., RSA and Diffie-Hellman) are often desired. 
In order to obtain the required level of performance (speed) on a selected platform, the 
developers turn to algorithm-level optimizations and assembly language programming. In 
this chapter, we examine these implementation issues and propose a design methodology 
for obtaining high-speed implementations. We show that between the full assembler im­
plementation and the standard C implementation, there is a design option in which only 
a small number of code segments (kernel operations) are written in assembler in order 
to obtain a significant portion of the speed increase gained by the full assembler imple­
mentation. We propose a small set of kernel operations which are as simple as a b + c, 
where the numbers a, b, c are 1 -word integers. The results of our experiments on several 
processors are also summarized. 
The privacy and authenticity of information (whether it is stored on a single com­
puter or shared on a network of computers) requires implementation of cryptographic 
functions [52]. The basic functions of information security services are very few, and al­
most invariant. These include public-key cryptosystems, digital signatures, message digest 
functions, and secret-key cryptographic algorithms [53, 54]. The design and evaluation of 
these cryptographic functions is a special topic on its own, requiring advanced knowledge 
of combinatorial mathematics, number theory, abstract algebra, and theoretical computer 
science [55]. There is also the subject of algorithm engineering, which refers to high-speed 
and cost effective hardware and software implementation of cryptographic algorithms [56]. 
Most public-key cryptographic functions require operations with elements of a large 46 
finite group, and need to be optimized on the chosen platform for high-speed implemen­
tation. As an example, the RSA cryptosystem [2] uses modular arithmetic operations 
(addition, multiplication, and exponentiation) with large integers, usually in the range of 
512 to 1024 bits. Arithmetic with such large integers is time consuming, considering the 
fact that currently available processor have arithmetic logic units with wordsize up to 32 
bits. The current fast implementations of the RSA signature algorithm with a 512-bit 
key size require on the order of 50 ms on a signal processor using advanced algorithmic 
techniques and assembly language programming [18]. However, the security requirements 
are already pushing the key size to 1024 bits, at which a signature operation takes nearly 
half a second. This is not an acceptable speed for most networking applications. Other 
cryptographic algorithms, for example, the Diffie-Hellman key exchange method [3], the 
ElGamal public-key cryptosystem and digital signature algorithm [57], the Digital Sig­
nature Standard [58] also require implementation of modular arithmetic operations with 
large integers. 
Software implementations of the number-theoretic cryptographic algorithms are of­
ten desired because of their flexibility and cost effectiveness [1].  Furthermore, certain 
applications are suitable for software implementations because of their very nature. How­
ever, the performance is always an issue, requiring the designer to optimize these cryp­
tographic algorithms on the selected processor. In order to exploit the architectural and 
arithmetic-logic properties of the processor, the designer needs to analyze and reformulate 
the underlying algorithms. Almost inevitably, the programming is performed in assembly 
language in order to take advantage of the specific architectural properties of the processor, 
and thus, to obtain the desired performance [18, 6, 17, 20, 59]. 
In this chapter, we examine these implementation issues in order to determine the 
actual contribution of assembly level programming to the speed of the cryptographic 
algorithms. We show that between the full assembler implementation and the standard C 
implementation, there is a design option in which only a small number of code segments 
are written in assembler in order to obtain a significant portion of the speed increase 47 
gained by the full assembler implementation [60].  These small code segments are the 
kernel of arithmetic operations for number-theoretic cryptographic algorithms, and have 
been obtained by analyzing several different implementations of these number-theoretic 
cryptosystems. We propose a small set (only 8) of such code segments, implementing 
certain arithmetic operations which are as simple as the computation of a b + c, where 
the numbers a, b, c are 1-word integers. 
Our experimental results on the Pentium PC show that by developing efficient  as­
sembly language implementation of these 8 operations as 'in-line' assembly code segments 
in the RSA cryptosystem, we can obtain a speedup of 2.33 over the standard C imple­
mentation.  This speedup is about 64 % of the speedup obtained by a full assembler 
implementation. 
4.2.  Implementation Methods 
The usefulness of a C implementation is due to its portability, i.e., the fact that 
the program can easily be compiled and executed on another machine. However, the C 
program may not execute as fast as an assembler program accomplishing the same compu­
tation since specific architectural properties of the new machine are not taken into account. 
On the other hand, efficient assembler software development requires full understanding of 
the sophisticated microprocessor architecture. The assembly language programmer needs 
to know the properties of the assembler instructions, the operation of multiple functioning 
units, the rules of instruction issuing, pipeline structure, and alignment rules, and also 
certain specific information about the cache and the memory structure. The development 
of assembler programs is a tedious, lengthy, and expensive task. It can be argued that a 
smart compiler will be aware of the detailed architectural issues, and thus, can produce 
more efficient code than a straightforward assembler implementation in many instances 
[61]. However, the developers of cryptographic systems often have to turn to assembly 48 
language programming in order to obtain the required speed. This way the programmer 
gets the chance to reformulate the algorithm to be implemented by taking into account 
the architectural properties of the processor. 
In this study, we consider the design options between the standard C and the as­
sembly language for implementing the number-theoretic cryptographic algorithms. The 
properties of these two extreme design options are: 
Standard C: Portable, inexpensive, short development time, slow execution. 
Assembler: Not portable, expensive, long development time, fast execution. 
There are several design options between these two ends. A particular design option 
involves the use of non-standard C data types such as int64 or long long. We name this 
approach C with Extended Types. It turns out some amount of speed increase can be 
gained using such data types for number-theoretic cryptography. We are however limited 
to those platforms which support these data types and their particular definitions and 
uses. We gain a certain amount of speed by renouncing a small amount of portability. 
As soon as the use of assembly language programming enters the picture, we loose 
portability. Once the portability is no longer an issue, the development cost of assembly 
language programming needs to be taken into account. One approach is the development 
of the entire code or the most crucial subroutines (e.g., the Montgomery multiplication and 
squaring) in the assembly language. This involves a great amount of assembly language 
programming, and we argue that it is not necessary in many instances. We propose a 
design approach in which only a specific kernel of operations need to be developed in 
assembler. In this chapter, we evaluate and compare the following four approaches in 
terms of their resulting performance. 
Standard C code 
C with extended types 49 
Complete assembler 
C with kernel in assembler 
4.2.1.  Standard C Code 
In the C language, operands of an arithmetic expression are converted to a common 
type before the computation [62, 63], which is referred to as converted type. The value of 
a variable may be truncated to a less significant type, or it can be promoted to a more 
significant type. The high order bits are ignored in case of truncation. The promotion 
is performed using zero padding or sign extension. The result of an operation is also 
of the converted type. The truncation inhibits availability of high order bits of certain 
arithmetic operations in C, enforcing an emulation approach for precise calculations. For 
an addition of n operands using w-bit scalar type, maximum value of result is n(2'  1). 
Assuming n < 2', the exact result can be stored in two w-bit words. Exact addition of 
such variables can be accomplished by computing lower and higher bits separately. The 
code segment given below adds two w-bit words to obtain the (w  1)-bit result. Low w 
bits are stored in S, and high order 1-bit (the carry) is stored in C. Multi-operand addition 
can be carried out similarly. 
#def ine  WSIZE  (8*sizeof (word)) 
#define MSBMASK  ((word)1 << (WSIZE-1)) 
S=(a & "MSBMASK) + (b & "MSBMASK);
 
C=(a >> (WSIZE-1)) + (b >> (WSIZE-1)) + (S >> (WSIZE-1));
 




A multiplication expression in C language stores only the low order word of the 
two-word product.  Let the multiplication be c  a  b where a and b are word type 
variables. The type of the result is also word. Thus, the actual product is truncated if 
b > 28*sizeogword). In order to compute the complete product, the w-bit input operands 50 
are split into two w/2-bit numbers. The following C code segment can be used to obtain 
the full result of c in the word pair (C,S). 
#define WSIZE  (8*sizeof(word))
 
#define LOWBITS(x)  ((x) & (-((word)0) >> (WSIZE/2)))
 
#define HIGHBITS(x)  ((x) >> (WSIZE/2))
 
albl = LOWBITS (a) * LOWBITS (b);
 
ahbl = HIGHBITS(a) * LOWBITS (b);
 
albh = LOWBITS (a) * HIGHBITS(b);
 
ahbh = HIGHBITS(a) * HIGHBITS(b);
 
sum = LOWBITS(albh) + LOWBITS(ahbl) + HIGHBITS(albl);
 
S = (sum << (WSIZE/2)) + LOWBITS(albl);
 
C = ahbh + HIGHBITS(albh) + HIGHBITS(ahbl) + HIGHBITS(sum);
 
4.2.2.  C with Extended Types
 
This approach relies on a non-standard type of the C programming language. The 
code is still portable, maintainable, and testable, however, it is restricted to the platform 
on which the the non-standard language extensions are supported. This method depends 
on the fact that a variable of twice the size of a general purpose register contains all 
result bits for the operation. Let the name of this extended type be  dword. We can then 
implement the addition and multiplication of two words as follows: 
Addition  Multiplication 
#define WSIZE  (8*sizeof(word))  #define WSIZE  (8*sizeof(word))
 
CS = (dword)a + (dword)b;  CS = (dword)a * (dword)b;
 
S = (word)CS;  S = (word)CS;
 
C = (word)(CS >> WSIZE);  C = (word)(CS >> WSIZE);
 
Here C and S are word type variables, and CS is a  dword type variable. The extended type 
can be used for other operations, e.g., shift and division. The C compiler must convert 
the right shifting by wordsize bits to a single register access to achieve better peformance. 51 
This approach does not require the assembler level implementation. However, the 
compiler must support the extended type, and also it should be capable of generating 
efficient code for C blocks involving the extended type.  Currently, most C compilers 
support double register-size variables. For example, Microsoft Visual C++ has "__int64" 
while most of UNIX C compilers have "long long" type for variables of twice the register-
size of the platform processor. 
4.2.3.  Complete Assembler 
An efficient assembler implementation of a cryptographic algorithm requires a de­
tailed study of the architecture of the underlying processor. Issues related to the instruc­
tion set architecture, register space, multiple functional units, and memory hierarchy need 
to be well understood. An assembler implementation produces smaller and faster code by 
sacrificing portability. However, assembler implementations are preferred if development 
costs are relatively less than final benefits. 
The Appendix gives assembler programming example codes in Intel Pentium and 
Sparc V9 assembly languages for performing several different operations with 32-bit num­
bers. For example, the operations ADD (C , S , a ,b) and MUL (C , S , a ,b) respectively denote 
(C, S) := a + b and (C, S) := a  b, where C, S, a, and b are 32-bit unsigned integers. 
4.2.4.  C with Kernel in Assembler 
The speedup obtained with the extended types is not as high as possible due to 
inefficient utilization of the processor architecture. The performance is limited by the 
optimization capabilities of the C compiler. We propose an alternative hybrid approach 
which benefits from flexibility of C and high performance of assembly languages. We 
minimize the development cost of assembly language programming by proposing a small 
set of arithmetic operations which need to be coded in the assembler. The remainder of 
the code is produced in the standard C. The proposed set of kernel operations is given on 
Table 4.1. 52 
TABLE 4.1: Kernel operations. 
Operation  Description 
ADD(C,S,a,b)  (C,S):=a+b 
ADD2(C,S,a,b,c)  (C,S):=a+b+c 
MUL(C,S,a,b)  (C,S) : =a -b 
MULADD(C,S,a,b,c)  (C,S):=a-b+c 
MULADD2(C,S,a,b,c,d)  (C,S) := ab +c +d 
MUL2ADD2(CC,C,S,a,b,c,d)  (CC, C, S) := 2 ab+c 
SQU(C,S,a)  (C,S) := a2 
SQUADD(C,S,a,b)  (C,S) := a2 + b 
The operations in Table 4.1 need to be coded in the assembly language as macros 
or in-line assembly code segments. They can be written as functions, but this creates 
considerable overhead. The best situation will be the one in which these operations are 
supported by the hardware either as instructions or macro instructions. 
The amount of assembly language is indeed minimal: each one of these operations 
can be coded using about 4 to 8 lines of assembler instructions. Therefore, the entire set 
requires about 60 lines of assembly code. The resulting standard C plus assembler code, if 
carefully constructed, can be ported on another machine quite easily: only the assembly 
code segments need to be developed for the new machine, replacing the existing segments. 
4.2.5.  Determination of Kernel 
The arithmetic operations in the kernel are obtained by analyzing the algorithms 
and the actual implementations of number-theoretic cryptosystems. The proposed ker­
nel is quite minimal in the sense adding other similar operations does not provide any 53 
FIGURE 4.1: Addition of two multi-precision integers: s = a + b where a = (a3a2aiao) 
and b = (b3b2b1bo) 
a3  a2  a1  ao  (Co, so)  ao + bo 
b3  b2  b1  bo 
(c1, S1) 
(C2, S2) 
al + bi + co 
a2 + b2 + ci 
54  S2  Si  so  (S4, 83)  a3 + b3 + C2 
more considerable speedup gain. Since our objective is to perform as little assembly pro­
gramming as possible, we carefully selected these operations among many candidates. 
These experiments were run on the Intel 486 DX4, Intel Pentium, and Sun UltraSparc-II 
V8+ machines by examining the algorithms and codes for the RSA and Diffie-Hellman 
algorithms. The implementation results are summarized in the next section. 
Determination of a minimal cryptographic kernel plays a key role in the efficiency 
introduced by the primitive operations. Our focus has been on describing the simple prim­
itives corresponding to a sequence of lengthy C statements observed in pseudocodes of the 
aforementioned algorithms, e.g., RSA and Diffie-Hellman. These algorithms require mod­
ular arithmetic using large integers. Multi-precision modular exponentiation composed 
of modular multiplications is accomplished by the Montgomery's multiplication method 
[5, 8, 20].  Multi-precision addition is used in the RSA private key operation based on 
Chinese Remainder Theorem [64, 32]. Addition and multiplication of two quad-precision 
unsigned integers are illustrated in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Pseudocodes for these operations 
utilizing the kernel primitives are given in Figure 4.3. In the pseudocodes, variables a, b 
and c are arrays of type word, k is the number of words to process. C and S are word 
variables. 54 
In Figure 4.1, each word of the 5-word sum (84, s3, 82, si, so) is formed by the ADD2 
kernel operation.  In Figure 4.2, x2,3 denotes the jth word of the partial product a 
b,. The multiplication of two quad-precision w-bit unsigned integers is accomplished by 
accumulating the partial products in the 8-word array s.  The accumulation requires 
addition of the previous product word s, to the partial product word x2,3.  Words of 
these partial products are computed by (c2,3,  = a3  b,  where cz,_i = 0 and 
j =  E3 =0  b,. k  1. Addition of the carry-word ci,3_1 is implicitly present in E3=0 ai 
This operation can be accomplished using the MULADD primitive. We used MULADD2 kernel 
primitive to compute (c2,3,  = a3  b2  c2,3_1  si+3.  The sample pseudocode in 
Figure 4.3 forms the product a b in the k-word array s by employing the MULADD2 kernel 
operation. Other primitive operations (e.g., MUL2ADD2 and SQUADD are used in squaring, 
i.e., when a = b. 
The plain C code fragments are obtained by replacing the addition and multiplica­
tion statement sequences given in the previous sections. It is clear that the use of primitive 
operations has drastically reduced the code size. Moreover, the performance gained by 
the kernel operations exceeds the benefits of the extended types in both speed and code 
size. 
4.3.  Implementation Results 
The proposed kernel of operations were implemented in the assembly languages 
of the Intel 486, Intel Pentium, and Sparc V9 machines. The Intel 486 DX4 processor 
has the speed of 100 MHz, and runs the NextStep operating system v3.3. We used the C 
compiler of the NextStep. Microsoft Visual C++ v4.2 and Intel VTune v2.0 are used in the 
development and analysis for the Intel Pentium processor on a Windows NT 3.51 system. 
The SPARCompiler SC4.0 is used on a UltraSparc-II V8+ system. The C compilers are 
configured to obtain speed-optimized code. 55 
We implemented the 512-bit and 1024-bit bit modular exponentiation operations 
which are common in the RSA and Diffie-Hellman algorithms. The exponentiation algo­
rithm is the binary method [5] using the Montgomery multiplication [8, 20]. The size of 
the modulus is 512 bits and 1024 bits. The exponent is selected as 1-word (32-bit) and 
full-size (the size of the modulus). Tables 4.2 and 4.3 give the timings in milliseconds for 
these operations. 
TABLE 4.2: Modular exponentiation timings for 32-bit exponent in milliseconds. 
Modulus  C with  C with 
Processor and OS  Size (bits)  C  E.Types  Kernel  Asm. 
i486DX4 100 MHz  512  29  28  26  10 
Next Step v3.3  1024  110  103  95  39 
Ultra Sparc-II V8+  512  8  5  6  3 
Solaris 5.5.1  1024  31  21  23  12 
Pentium 120 MHz  512  15  11  8  5 
NT v3.51  1024  57  43  28  18 
The fastest implementation is obtained using assembly language programming. For 
example, the assembler implementation of full-size modular exponentiation with 1024 bits 
is about 3.63 times faster than the standard C implementation on the Pentium machine. 
The standard C coupled with kernel operations produces a code which is 2.33 times faster 
than the standard C code, which is about 64 % of the speed increase gained by the assem­
bler implementation. Table 4.4 illustrates the speedup of the other three approaches to the 
standard C implementation for performing modular exponentiation where the exponent 
is the full size (i.e., it is equal to the modulus size). 
On the UNIX machines (Next Step and Solaris), we implemented the kernel opera­
tions using functions, since in-line assembly coding is not flexible due to inability to access 56 
TABLE 4.3: Modular exponentiation timings for full-word exponent in milliseconds. 
Modulus  C with  C with 
Processor and OS  Size (bits)  C  E.Types  Kernel  Asm. 
i486DX4 100 MHz  512  488  405  363  205 
Next Step v3.3  1024  3,775  3,195  2,800  1,559 
Ultra Sparc-II V8+  512  150  103  106  55 
Solaris 5.5.1  1024  1,144  790  795  414 
Pentium 120 MHz  512  206  151  91  59 
NT v3.51  1024  1,618  1,166  694  446 
the C variables in the inline assembly code. In this case, the speed increase gained by the 
use of kernel operations is given away due to the function calling overhead. For example, 
the C with kernel operations case is slightly slower than the C with extended types case on 
the Sparc machine running Solaris. It seems that the extended types are more efficiently 
utilized by the C compiler on the Next machine. Thus, we observe a small amount of 
speedup comparing the C with kernel operations to the C with extended types. 
4.4.  Conclusions 
We have proposed a design methodology and a small set of kernel operations for 
obtaining high-speed implementations of the number-theoretic cryptographic algorithms. 
It is shown that up to 64 % of speed increase gained by the use of full assembler implemen­
tation can be obtained by coding only this small set of kernel operations in the assembly 
language of the underlying processor. It is preferred that the development system provide 
in-line assembly coding in order to avoid the overhead of function calling in implementing 
the kernel operations. 57 
TABLE 4.4: Speedup with respect to the standard C implementation. 
Modulus  C with  C with  Kernel 
Processor and OS  Size (bits)  E.Types  Kernel  Asm  vs Asm 
i486DX4  512  1.20  1.34  2.38  56 % 
Next Step v3.3  1024  1.18  1.34  2.42  55 % 
Ultra Sparc-II V8+  512  1.46  1.42  2.73  52 % 
Solaris v5.5.1  1024  1.45  1.45  2.76  53 % 
Pentium  512  1.36  2.26  3.49  65 % 
NT v3.51  1024  1.39  2.33  3.63  64 % 
This approach allows the programmer to drastically reduce assembly language pro­
gramming while gaining a significant speedup. Since the assembler portion is quite min­
imal (a total of 60 lines at most), the maintainability and testability of the code are 
retained. The code can easily be ported to a different platform (processor) by imple­
menting only the suggested set of kernel operations. Furthermore, the kernel operations 
proposed in this chapter are easy to implement in hardware.  If they are available as 
instructions (or macros) on microprocessors or signal processors, high-speed implementa­
tions of number-theoretic cryptographic algorithms can easily be obtained. 
4.5.  Implementation of Kernel Operations 
The Pentium and Sparc V9 assembler implementations of the proposed kernel are 
given in the following two sections. 58 
4.5.1.  Intel Pentium 
ADD(C,S,a,b)  ADD2(C,S,a,b,c) 
mov  eax,dword ptr [a]  mov  eax,dword ptr [a] 
mov  ebx,dword ptr [b]  mov  ebx,dword ptr [b] 
mov  dword ptr [C],0  xor  edx,edx 
add  eax,ebx  mov  ecx,dword ptr [c] 
mov  dword ptr [S],eax  mov  dword ptr [C],edx 
setc  byte ptr [C]  add  eax,ebx 
setc  byte ptr [C] 
add  eax,ecx 
mov  dword ptr [S],eax 
adc  dword ptr [C],0 
MUL(C,S,a,b)  MULADD(C,S,a,b,c) 
mov  eax,dword ptr [a]  mov  eax,dword ptr [a] 
mul  dword ptr  [b]  mov  ebx,dword ptr [c] 
mov  dword ptr  [C],edx  mul  dword ptr  [b] 
mov  dword ptr  [S],eax  add  eax,ebx 
adc  edx,0 
mov  dword ptr  [S],eax 
mov  dword ptr  [C],edx 
MULADD2(C,S,a,b,c,d)  MUL2ADD2(CC,C,S,a,b,c) 
mov  eax,dword ptr [a]  mov  eax,dword ptr [a] 
mov  ebx,dword ptr [c]  mul  dword ptr [b] 
mul  dword ptr [b]  add  eax,eax 
add  eax,ebx  mov  dword ptr [CC],O 
mov  ebx,dword ptr [d]  adc  edx,edx 
adc  edx,0  mov  ebx,dword ptr [c] 
add  eax,ebx  adc  byte ptr [CC],O 
adc  edx,0  add  eax,ebx 
mov  dword ptr [S],eax  adc  edx,0 
mov  dword ptr [C],edx  mov  dword ptr [S],eax 
mov  dword ptr [C],edx 
adc  byte ptr [CC],O 
SQU(C,S,a)  SQUADD(C,S,a,b) 
mov  eax,dword ptr [a]  mov  eax,dword ptr [a] 
mul  eax  mov  ebx,dword ptr [b] 
mov  dword ptr [S],eax  mul  eax 
mov  dword ptr [C],edx  add  eax,ebx 
adc  edx,0 
mov  dword ptr [S],eax 
mov  dword ptr [C],edx 59 




ciruw  %o2 
ciruw  %o3 
add  %o2,%o3,%gl 
srlx  %g1,32,%g2 
stuw  %g1,[%ol] 
retl 

























































ciruw  %o2 
ciruw  Xo3 
ciruw  %o4 
add  %02,%03,%gl 
add  %gl,%04,%gl 
srlx  %g1,32,%g2 
stuw  %gl,[7.01] 
ret1 



































































stuw  ' /.g2, [ %o0]
 60 
FIGURE 4.2:  Multiplication of two multi-precision integers:  s = a  b  where a = 
(a3a2aiao) and b = (b3b2bibo). Here, xj,3 denotes a partial product. 
a3  a2  al  ao 
x  b3  b2  bl  bo 
10,4  10,3  10,2  X0,1  10,0  4 a  bo  =  Ei3=_0 a  bo 
11,4  11,3  11,2  X1,1  X1,0  + a  bi  =  3=0 a 
3 bi 
3 12,4  12,3  12,2  12,1  1270  --4 a  b2  = E j=0 a  b2 
13,4  13,3  13,2  134  13,0  a  b3  b3 = E7 =0 a
 
87  56  85  84  83  82 Si so
 
FIGURE 4.3: Pseudocodes for multi-precision addition and multiplication. 
Addition  Multiplication 
C := 0  for i=0 to 2*k-1 do  s[i]  := 0
 
for i=0 to k-1 do  for 1=0 to k-1 do
 
ADD2(C , S , a [i] ,b [i] ,C)  C := 0
 
s[i]  := S  for j=0 to k-1 do
 
s [k]  := C  MULADD2 (C ,S , a [i]  [i] ,s [i+j] ,C)
 
s [i+j]  := S
 
s [i+k]  := C
 61 
5.	  AN INSTRUCTION SET ARCHITECTURE FOR 
CRYPTOGRAPHY 
5.1.  Introduction 
The execution time of a certain task is computed by accumulating the time consumed 
for each instruction executed in the life time of that task. The execution time is a function 
of the instruction count and cycles a processor consumes for each instruction. Thus, a 
software runs faster if the frequently used instructions are executed in fewer clock cycles. 
In order to obtain the instruction histogram of a number-theoretic cryptosystem software, 
we modified our programs to compute the number of instructions actually executed on 
Intel Pentium platforms. Then, we deduced which instructions should be optimized for a 
better performance. In addition to that, we also proposed a set of new instructions which 
would speed up numerous cryptographic algorithms including RSA, DSA, RC5 and DES. 
In the foregoing sections, we explore individual instructions of the Intel and SPARC 
architectures and then propose new instructions to obtain high-speed number-theoretic 
cryptographic applications. Because of the particular challanges of fast software imple­
mentation of cryptographic algorithms on Intel 486/Pentium/Pentium Pro, and because 
of the pervasiveness of this processor family, we concentrated on Intel Pentium architec­
ture. By doing well on these difficult-to-optimize-for vehicles we expect to do well on any 
modern, 32 or 64-bit processor. 
We restrain ourselves from introducing a completely new instruction set architecture 
since it would hardly find actual application and introduce export restriction disadvantage. 62 
5.2.  Instruction Distribution of Cryptographic Software 
Our RSA implementation on the Intel Pentium processor yields the instruction dis­
tribution depicted on Tables 5.1 and 5.2. These figures denote the instruction distribution 
of Intel Pentium assembler programs. Table 5.1 denotes the number of instructions exe­
cuted to perform a modular exponentiation with 32-bit exponent and 1024-bit modulus. 
This corresponds to 1024-bit RSA encryption. 
Table 5.2 denotes the number of instructions executed to perform a modular ex­
ponentiation with 1024-bit exponent and 1024-bit modulus. However, 1024-bit exponent 
is splited into two 512-bit exponents, and 1024-bit modulus is splited into two 512-bit 
moduli. Then, the final operation is accomplished by combining two 512-bit exponen­
tiations using the Chinese Remainder Theorem [64]. This corresponds to 1024-bit RSA 
decryption. 
Both figures indicate that the mov instruction is the most used instruction. The 
Intel Pentium processor executes mov instruction in single cycle and this instruction can 
be paired in either U or V pipes.  Thus, frequent use of the mov instruction does not 
introduce a significant bottleneck.  Similar observation is also made for add and adc 
instructions. However, the compiler or the assembler programmer must be aware that adc 
instruction is not pairable in the V pipe. On the other hand, the mul instruction, with 
its 10-cycle execution time, is not pairable in either pipe. Therefore, one mul instructions 
consumes roughly 10 ÷ 0.5 = 20 times more CPU cycles compared to mov instruction, 
assuming 100% pairing for mov instruction. That introduces a significant drawback in the 
implementations of number-theoretic cryptosystems. 
One interesting instruction is the lea, load effective address, with its relatively high 
occurence. lea is also used to add a register to another register scaled by 2, 4, or 8, and an 
8-bit immediate constant, resulting in a three additions in one cycle. This instruction adds 
& scales registers in base address calculations, finds a common usage in regular additions 63 
FIGURE 5.1: Intel Pentium instruction counts for 1024-bit modular exponentiation with 
32-bit exponent. 
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and address increments in loops, which increased its occurrence count. 
Instructions rcl and sill are heavily used in Montgomery squaring to compute 
2 a  b, where a and b are two 32-bit quantities. rcl and shl instructions are preferred 
over shid, because the latter one is not pairable in either pipe and comsumes a relatively 
higher number of cycles. setc is used to eliminate a considerable number of conditional 
jump statements, thereby preventing BTB (branch target buffer) misses. cmp, jie and 
inc instructions are primarily used to set up loops and manage loop counters. Similar 
counts for these instructions on Table 5.1 confirms this observation. 64 
FIGURE 5.2: Intel Pentium instruction counts for 1024-bit modular exponentiation with
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5.3.  Case 1: Intel Pentium and PentiumPro Processors 
Many features of the Intel Pentium and Pentium Pro are inherited from the Intel x86 
architecture which dates back to more than 20 years ago. The relevant limitations of the 
486/Pentium/Pentium Pro processor family are: a small register set and a two operand 
architecture [65, 66, 67, 68]. In more detail, these chips are 32-bit CISC processors with 
current ones running at upto 233 MHz. They have eight general purpose registers, and six 
segment registers. The instructions generally work on two operands (A  A op B) instead 
of three (A  B op C). Pentium and Pentium Pro have separate on-chip instruction and 
data caches and pipelined instruction decoding. Pentium has two execution pipelines, U 
and V, where a limited set of instructions are paired. On the other hand, Pentium Pro has 
three parallel instruction decoders, out-of-order issue and out-of-order execution features. 65 
We propose additional instructions on Table 5.1 to the current Pentium instruction 
set architecture. We used the cryptographic kernel operations introduced in the previous 
chapter to derive these instructions. 
Operands of the instructions are shown as registers, but might also be memory 
operands. It might not be easy to encode the three-operand instructions on the intel Pen­
tium architecture. However, the operands may be implicit operands, i.e., the destination 
might be hardcoded as edx ,eax register pair as in the existing mul instruction. 
TABLE 5.1: Proposed instructions to the Intel Pentium processor. 
Instruction  Operands  Operation  Description 
muladd  ri, r2, r3  (ri , T2) = r1  r2 + r3  multiply-add 
mul2add  ri, r2, r3  (C,ri,r2) = 2 ri  r2 + c3  multiply by 2, then add 
mulgf 2  ri,r2  (ri,r2) = r1  r1  GF(2) multiply 
The result of the first operation always fits into two registers, because the maximum 
value is less than 22W, where w is the wordsize of the operands: (2' 1) (2'  1)+ (2' 1) = 
22W  2W < 22W. 
The  mul2add instruction first multiplies two registers specified by its operands. 
Then, it shifts the product to the left by one bit position and adds the third operand to 
this shifted product. Then, the result fits in 65 bits for 32 bit operands, hence the carry 
bit C is used as part of the result. 
The last instruction, mulgf  2, multiplies two polynomials of length w = 32 bits over 
GF(2), and generates 2w = 64 bit product in the destination register pair. Hardware 
requirements of this instruction is fairly less: inhibition of carry generation in the integer 66 
multiplication hardware yields the desired operation. A comparison of GF(2) multiplica­
tion and exponentiation operations using mulgf 2 instruction is elaborated in [19, 50]. 
5.4.  Case 2: Intel MMX Technology 
We have analyzed the instruction set and related architectural features of the MMX 
technology for obtaining high-speed implementations of certain cryptographic algorithms. 
In this section, we mainly concentrated on the RSA and DSS algorithms, DES, IDEA and 
RC5 block ciphers. We implemented the RSA and DSS algorithms on a MMX platform, 
and obtained timings on a 233 MHz Pentium Pro/MMX processor. These timings in­
dicate that the number-theoretic cryptographic algorithms implemented using the MMX 
instructions are significantly slower than those implemented using Pentium instructions. 
This turns out to be mainly due to the fact that the MMX architecture performs signed 
arithmetic and lacks certain instructions such as 16-bit and 32-bit unsigned multiply and 
multiply-add. After carefully examining the kernel of operations for the considered cryp­
tographic algorithms, we propose a set of new instructions for the next generation MMX 
technology. 
5.4.1.  RSA and DSS 
The current MMX instruction set has three multiplication instructions. Two of 
them multiply two signed 16 bit words and compute the low (PMULL) or high ( PMULH) 16 
bits of the product. Another instruction multiplies two signed 16 bit words and adds two 
such products (PMADD). Each instruction executes four of such multiplications in parallel 
However, number-theoretic cryptographic applications require unsigned multiplications. 
Therefore, we propose the set of instructions on Table 5.2 to the current MMX instruction 
set. 
On Table 5.2, each register r, is a 64-bit MMX register. The second operands are 
also represented by a registers, but they might be 64-bit memory locations similar to other 67 
TABLE 5.2: Proposed instruction additions to the Intel MMX technology. 
Instruction  Operation
 
paddq r1, r2  ri =--- ri + r2
 
padcq r1, r2  ri = r1 + r2 + C
 
pmuluwd  7.1, r2  r1 (63  32) = ri (47  32)  r2 (47  32)
 
ri (31  0) = r1(15  0) . r2 (15  0)
 
pmuludq  ri , r2  ri = ri (31  0) . r2 (31  0)
 
pmuluq  r1, r2  (Ti , r2) = r1  r2
 
pmaddudq  ri r2  r1 = ri (63  32)  r2 (63  32) + ri (31  0)  r2 (31  0)
 
MMX instructions. Indices in the paranthesis denote the bit numbers in the 64-bit MMX 
registers. 
5.4.2.  RC5 
RC5 algorithm has three primitive operations [69] as listed below. 
1. Two's complement addision and subtraction. 
These are readily available on MMX. However, 64-bit RC5 addition would benefit 
64-bit addition and subtraction (paddq, psubq) instructions. 
2. Bit-wise exclusive-OR, XOR. 
3. Data dependent left and right rotate (spin), ROR, ROL. 
There is no rotate instruction in the MMX instruction set. Data dependent rotate 
(spin) instructions constitute the security core of the RC5 algorithm. These opera­
tions are emulated using shift and OR instructions. Thus, it is anticipated that data 
dependent left/right rotate instructions (pror, prol) would improve RC5 perfor­
mance on MMX. 68 
Thus, for a fast RC5 implementation exploiting the Intel MMX features, we find 
the instructions on Table 5.3 beneficial. The second operands are also represented by 
registers, but they might be 64-bit memory locations similar to other MMX instructions. 
On the table, <<< and >>> denote left and right rotate (spin) operations. 
TABLE 5.3: Proposed instruction additions for to the Intel MMX technology for RC5. 
Instruction  Operation 
pror ri, r2/imm,8  r1 = ri <<< r2 /imm8 
prol ri,r2/imm8  r1 = ri >>> r2I imm8 
paddq ri, r2  ri = ri + r2 
psubq ri, r2  ri = ri  r2 
5.4.3.  DES 
DES has the following primitive operations [70]: 
1. BIT-wise exclusive-OR, XOR. 
2. Shift by immediate count. 
3. Rotate by immediate count. 
However, 64-bit registers and 64-bit shift/XOR MMX instructions eliminate the need for 
rotate instruction. Thus, we did not find a general instruction which would improve DES 
throughput on the MMX technology. 
5.4.4.  IDEA 
The primitive operations of IDEA are listed below [71, 72]: 69 
1. Bit-wise exclusive-OR, XOR. 
2. Two's complement 16-bit addition modulo 216, ADD, no carry. 
3. Unsigned 16-bit multiplication modulo 216 + 1. 
The first two operations are readily available in the MMX instruction set.  The third 
operation is a special multiplication modulo 216 + 1 where inputs are treated as unsigned 
integers, but 0 (zero) corresponds to -1, i.e.  216 = 1. This multiplication does not 
produce a 0 product provided that operands are not zero, because 216 + 1 is a prime. 
Thus, this operations is essentially a 16-bit unsigned multiplication where 0 is treated 
separately. The 32-bit signed multiplication instruction pmull can be used to multiply 
two unsigned 16-bit operands. 
5.5.  Case 3: SPARC V9 
Sparc V9 is a 64-bit architecture downward compatible with the earlier Sparc family 
of processors [73, 74]. It contains 64-bit register and a 64-bit ALU which are important 
for development of number-theoretic cryptographic algorithms. It can perform arithmetic 
operations on two 64-bit operands such as addition, subtraction, multiplication and di­
vision. However, lack of certain 64-bit operations limits the maximum performance this 
architecture would yield. 
The first problem appears in the 64-bit addition-with-carry. The carry-in bit is al­
ways the 32-bit carry bit. The 64-bit add-with-carry instruction adds two 64-bit operands 
and the 32-bit carry bit. Then, addition of a very long integer using multiple 64-bit addi­
tion instructions is not easily streamlined, requiring a manipulation with the carry bits, or 
using 32-bit arithmetic. The second problem is with the 64-bit multiplication instruction. 
The result of a 64 by 64-bit multiplication is 64-bit: the high order 64-bits are truncated, 
causing the developer to feed two 32-bit operands to obtain a 64-bit product. 70 
We propose three additional instructions to the V9 architecture. These are listed 
on Table 5.4. 
TABLE 5.4: Proposed instructions to Sparc V9 architecture. 
Instruction  Operation 
addcc Lor_x_cc,regrsl ,reg_or_imm,regrd  Add with carry i_or_x_cc 
addccc Lor_x_cc,ren arsl ,reg_or_imm,regrd  Add with carry i_or_x_cc and modify cc's 
umulx regrsl,reg_or_imm,regrd  Unsigned multiply, result in regrd,regrsi pair 
Addition instructions addcc and addccc accepts either 32-bit carry (i_cc) or 64­
bit carry (x_cc) as carry-out and carry-in.  Both instructions compute regrd=regr,i+ 
reg_or_imm +i_or_x_cc.  addccc also modifies the 32-bit or 64-bit carry flag (i_or_x_cc) 
according to the result of the addition. 
umulx is an unsigned extended multiplication instruction computing (regrd,regi) 
= reg_or_imm x regrsi .  If the operands are less than 32-bits, then the product fits in 
one 64-bit register. In this case, the result is in regrd, and regrsi is zeroized. However, if 
the product is larger than 264  1, then the high-order 64-bits of the product are stored 
in regrsi, and low-order 64-bits are stored in regrd. In either case, the initial contents of 
regrsi are overwritten. 71 
6.  CASE STUDIES
 
6.1.  Introduction 
We developed a number of cryptographic functions in C and in various assembly 
languages. In spite of many cryptographic algorithms available, only a subset of them 
found applications in real life.  In the developed software routines, we experienced that 
the following algorithms are often practised: 
a) RSA encryption and decryption [53, 75] 
b) Diffie-Hellman key exchange [53, 75] 
c) Data Encryption Standard (DES) [70, 76, 71, 77] 
d) Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) [78, 79] 
e) MD2, Message Digest Algorithm [80] 
f) MD4, Message Digest Algorithm [71] 
g) MD5, Message Digest Algorithm [81] 
h) Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA, DSS) [4] 
i) Password based encryption and decryption (PBE) [53] 
j) International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) [71, 72] 
k) RC2, encryption [71] 
1) RC5, variable key-size encryption [69, 71] 
m) Random number generation [82, 83] 
We refrain from giving a complete list, because we believe that there is not an 
actual complete list of cryptographic algorithms. Some of the items on the presented 
list may be obsolete, and others may (and will) be added. In the following sections, our 
implementations on various platforms are introduced. 72 
6.2.  A Cryptographic Multi-Precision Library in C 
A Cryptographic Multi-Precision (CMP) library is designed and developed for RSA 
Data Security.  The library contains core functions of the RSA data security system 
including modular exponentiation. Programs are written in C and in i486 assembler. 
Montgomery multiplication and squaring routines are optimized for the Intel 486 processor. 
The CMP library contains arithmetic functions which can be used as building blocks 
of number-theoretic cryptosystems. These functions perform modular addition, subtrac­
tion, multiplication and exponentiation on multi-precision unsigned integers. The func­
tions in this library are listed on Table 6.1. Each argument is of type CMPInt. This is a 
structure composed of three members:  value an unsigned integer array where the words 
of a multi-precision integer are stored,  length the number of words in the array,  space 
the number of words reserved in memory. 
6.3.  RSA and MD5 Implementations on TMS320C16 
A cryptographic library is developed for RSA Data Security. The library contains 
PKCS compliant 512-bit RSA crypto-system and MD5 message digest algorithm [53, 81, 
84] for signature operations. Programs are written in TMS320C16 assembly language 
using a TMS320C16 add-on PC card and development package. The function calling 
sequences of signing and verification are depicted in Figure 6.1.  In the figure, boxes 
represent function blocks. Function input and output arguments are BSafe compatible 
type, which enables the developed software package to interface with BSafe using ASN.1 
data structures [85, 86]. 
This signal processor does not have an unsigned multiplication instruction. Thus, 
16 by 16-bit unsigned multiplication is accomplished using 15-bit multiplication and cor­
rective additions. If the product t := a x b is computed, the multiplication operation is 73 
FIGURE 6.1: Signing and verification on TNIS320C16 implementation. 
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A D 
where a, b and t are 16-bit quantities and subscripts are used as bit indices. Product in 
part D is computed by a multiplication instruction. Operands to this instruction are low 
order 15 bits of a and b. Low order 15 bits of b are left-shifted 15 bits and added to this 
partial product if a15 = 1 in part B. Similarly, low order 15 bits of a are left-shifted 15 74 
bits and added if b15 = 1 in part C. Finally, in part A, a constant number 23° is added if 
both a15 = 1 and b15 = 1. 
A 512-bit RSA decryption takes about 1.5 second on TMS320C16. The major reason 
of this slow execution time is the lack of unsigned multiplication instruction as expressed 
in the previous paragraph. 
MD5 algorithm heavily uses logical operations such as shift and rotate. However, 
shift instructions on this processor are also signed and there is no rotate instruction. 
Thus, an unsigned shift and rotate are also accomplished through emulation, introducing 
a drawback in performance. 
As a conclusion, double-size accumulator and single-cycle multiplication are the 
only beneficial features of TMS320C16 for number-theoretic cryptographic algorithms. 
Conversely, lack of unsigned operations, i.e., multiplication and shift/rotate, restricted 
register set, and indirect program memory access supersedes the advantages. 
6.4.  Intel Cryptographic Library on The Pentium Processor 
A cryptographic library is designed and developed for Intel Corporation.  This 
project is currently extended to include elliptic curve cryptosystems. We named this 
software Intel Cryptographic Library (ICL). Programs are written in C and Pentium as­
sembly language, and optimized for the Pentium processor. Up to our knowledge, the 
fastest RSA, MD5, MD2, DES, SHA, DSS, RC5 implementations on Intel processors are 
contained within this library. 
RSA cryptosystem, password-based encryption, and Digital Signature Algorithm 
and a random number generator are written by myself. A 1024-bit RSA public key 
operation and a private-key operations takes 5 and 110 milliseconds, respectively, on an 
Intel Pentium 120 MHz system running Windows NT v4.0. Programs are developed using 
Microsoft Visual C++ v4.x. 75 
6.5.  RSA Implementation on Sparc V9 
RSA crypto-system has been developed for Naval Research Laboratories,  Internet 
Technologies Division. We designed and developed the library on Sun UltraSparc-II (V8+) 
[73, 74]. Most of the func­ based on a SPARC V9 processor system running Solaris 5.1 
tions are written in Sparc V9 assembly language, utilizing the 64-bit architecture of the 
processor. 
We have developed the software as a replacement to RSA part of the RSA Data 
Security's BSAFE v3.0 cryptographic toolkit [85]. Software has a BSAFE-like interface 
Programs are featuring full PKCS compatibility with ASN.1, BER and DER [53, 86].
 
developed using Spar Compiler v4.0.  Up to our knowledge, the fastest  RSA encryption
 
and decryption functions on Sun SPARC V9 processor is contained within our library.
 
A 1024-bit input is encrypted by RSA algorithm in less than 10 milliseconds using 
the assembler version of the developed software running on a Ultra Sparc-II, a V9 powered 
V8+ Sun architecture. 1024-bit RSA decryption takes 94 milliseconds.  RSA encryption 
and decryption benchmarks of the  C version are 21 and 171 milliseconds,  respectively. 
In the C versions, extended type long long is used. These figures are  significant im­
provements over RSA BSafe benchmarks which takes 230 milliseconds for 1024-bit RSA 
decryption. 76 
TABLE 6.1: List of CMP fuctions. 
Description Function 
t := a CMPMove (a, t) 
a <=> b CMPCompare (a, b) 
a := a + x ,  x one word CMPInc (a, x) 
a := a  x ,  x one word
CMPDec (a, x) 
t := a + b CMPAdd (a, b, t) 
t := a b CMPMul (a, b, t) 
t := a div b CMPDiv (a, b, q) 
t := a mod b CMPRem (a, b, r) 
t := a + b mod n CMPModAdd (a, b, n, t) 
t := a  b mod n CMPModSub (a, b, n, t) 
t := a b mod n CMPModMu1 (a, b, n, t) 
g := gcd(a, b) CMPGCD (a, b, g) 
t := a-1 mod n CMPModInv (a, n, t) 
t := ae mod n CMPModExp (a, e, n, t) 
c mod p)  q + 11/12 CMPModExpCRT (a, dp, dq, n, p, q, c, t)	  t := ((M1  M-2)
 
11,11  :=---- (C mod p)dP mod p
 
M2 : = (C mod 1)4 mod q
 77 
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